

書 評

Reviews

Chinese Fiction of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. By Patrick Hanan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Pp. vii + 285.

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Any scholarly writing by Patrick Hanan, Victor S. Thomas Professor of Chinese Literature emeritus at Harvard, is to be welcomed; regardless of topic, it is sure to be worth our careful consideration. This essay collection marks yet another direction taken in his four-decade long career of distinguished publications, and it is as important as his previous writings. In his early years, Hanan wrote definitive studies on the early editions and the written sources for the Ming novel, *Jin Ping Mei* 金瓶梅, and the standard introduction to Chinese fiction and drama for English readers. The first two (1962, 1963) were models of exhaustive and insightful research; the third (1964) set the standard for thoughtful, carefully considered, and convincingly presented generalizations on China's popular literary traditions.¹ Much of his career was devoted to short vernacular fiction, *huaben xiaoshuo* 話本小說, of the late Ming and early Qing. Over the years he produced three excellent monographs; these and his numerous essays again were trailblazing in importance. In *The Chinese Short Story* (1974) Hanan outlined and tested a means of dating the original stories by reference to stylistic features which, despite its admitted limitations, still complicates scholarly knowledge of Feng Menglong's 馮夢龍 *San yan* 三言 collections (1621-1627). Hanan's *The Chinese Vernacular Story* (1981) explored with great clarity all major *huaben* collections. His essays written during the 1970s were by turns or simultaneously critical, theoretical, and historical, each a major contribution to

¹ "The Text of the *Chin P'ing Mei*," *Asia Major* (New series) 9.1 (1962): 1-57; "The Sources of the *Chin P'ing Mei*," *Asia Major* (New series) 10.2 (1963): 23-67; "The Development of Fiction and Drama," in *The Legacy of China*, ed. Raymond Dawson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 115-43.

understanding the vernacular story form.² These led to the study of the peripatetic writer Li Yu 李漁 (1610/11-1680); in this phase of his career Hanan produced *The Invention of Li Yu* (1988), two volumes of translations of Li's short fiction (1990 and 1992), and a highly readable English version of the erotic novel that Li Yu apparently wrote, *Rou putuan* 肉蒲團, as *The Carnal Prayer Mat* (1990).³ Within the last decade or so Hanan turned his attention to the fiction of the very end of the Qing period. Here again he produced excellent translations; his renditions are elegant in style, impeccable in accuracy, and well supported with succinct critical introductions.⁴ He also produced a number of fine essays, most of which are collected in the volume under review.⁵

Here Hanan examines important examples from the full range of late imperial-early modern Chinese narrative literature, including texts written by foreigners and translations (and rewritings) of literature in other languages. Not surprisingly, Hanan reaches new and provocative conclusions, about the degree of innovation among late 19th century writers, the deliberate interaction between China's writers and literature of the outer world, the role of the periodical press in the development of indigenous writing, and the contributions of foreign residents of China in the development of its modern fiction. Through critical reappraisals of overlooked or misinterpreted historic documents of China's engagement with the modern Europeanized world, Hanan here advances a significantly more complicated view of late Qing writing. Although his purpose was not to write a survey, his interpretations will change our understanding of this pivotal period in Chinese literary history.

Hanan's "Introduction" identifies his subjects and provides synopses of his

² *The Chinese Short Story: Studies in Dating, Authorship, and Composition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); *The Chinese Vernacular Story* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); "The Making of The Pearl-Sewn Shirt and The Courtesan's Jewel Box," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 33 (1973): 124-53; "The Early Chinese Short Story: A Critical Theory in Outline," in *Studies in Chinese Literary Genres*, ed. Cyril Birch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 299-338; "The Nature of Ling Meng-ch'u's Fiction," *Chinese Narrative: Critical and Theoretical Essays*, ed. Andrew H. Plaks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 85-114; "The Fiction of Moral Duty: The Vernacular Story in the 1640s," in *Expressions of Self in Chinese Literature*, eds. Robert E. Hegel and Richard C. Hessney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 189-213.

³ *The Invention of Li Yu* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Li Yu, *Silent Operas*, ed. Hanan (Hong Kong: Research Centre for Translation, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990); Li Yu, *A Tower for the Summer Heat*, trans. Hanan (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); *The Carnal Prayer Mat* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990).

⁴ Hanan, trans. *The Sea of Regret* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995); Chen Diexian, *The Money Demon* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).

⁵ See also his "Chinese Christian Literature: The Writing Process," in *Treasures of the Yen-ching*, ed. Hanan (Cambridge: Harvard-Yenching Library, 2003), pp. 260-83. I have certainly not exhausted his list of publications in these notes, by the way.

arguments. He also explains that seven of these essays previously appeared in print between 1998 and 2004; three are published here for the first time. The last chapter on Lu Xun first appeared in 1974.⁶ One might question Hanan's reasons for including an old essay along with his most recent efforts. Have his views on this material not changed over three decades of further study? In fact, this essay forms an appropriate conclusion to the volume by demonstrating the continuities in fiction writing from the middle of the 19th century through the 1920s (rather than the "radical break" Chinese scholarship conventionally posits between Lu Xun and his immediate predecessors). Hanan's readings of Lu Xun's interactions with other literatures have remained influential ever since the essay was first published; revisiting his conclusions in this new context only confirms Hanan's earlier perspicacity—by exploring the *writerly* aspects of this fiction (rather than contemporary political events) he reveals with unprecedented clarity the literary experimentation of this turbulent period, of which Lu Xun's "revolutionary" stories were only the most recent development. Furthermore, by focusing on the general question of fictional narrators in his first chapter as he did in his last, Hanan neatly encloses the others within contrasts that further illuminate the period under consideration. Reading from cover to cover, one would not necessarily detect that these essays were written at different times and published separately. Each leads logically to the next, each building on the insights of the previous chapter.

In "The Narrator's Voice before the 'Fiction Revolution'," Hanan draws a useful distinction (following Gérard Genette) between the narrator's perspective and the "voice" through which the narrative is presented. By examining the latter Hanan demonstrates a most productive way to understand the creative experimentation in late Qing fiction. He considers *Ernü yingxiong zhuan* 兒女英雄傳, *Hua yue hen* 花月痕, *Fengyue meng* 風月夢 (1848), *Pinhua baojian* 品花寶鑑 (1849), and others, finding considerable differences between those that rely on a personalized storyteller and others that use authors' personae. In this regard he observes that *Xichao kuaishi* 熙朝快史 (1895) "deserves to be regarded as the earliest extant modern novel" (21).

Hanan's Chapter 2, "Illusion of Romance and the Courtesan Novel," explores two distinct strains of *xiaxie xiaoshuo* 狹邪小說 or courtesan novels, idealized *caizi jiaren xiaoshuo* 才子佳人小說, and the realistic type, of which the rare *Fengyue meng* is a noteworthy example. Hanan characterizes this as China's first "city novel" for its extensive descriptions of locations throughout Yangzhou. "No novel is better than *Illusion of Romance* at giving a sense of urban crowding," he observes (38). "The Missionary Novels of Nineteenth-Century China," Chapter 3, traces what Hanan suspects was a formative influence on 19th century literary experimentation, the novels that various missionaries wrote in Chinese with the help of Chinese assistants.

⁶ On p. 8n1, Hanan explains that only Chapters 1, 7, and 9 have not been previously published. Chapter 11 appeared first in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 34 (1974): 53-96. This chapter has been slightly shortened and the Romanization has been changed to *Hanyu pinyin* from the Wade-Giles in the earlier essay.

None were of particular literary interest; their purpose was to present Christian doctrine. However, they circulated widely; William Milne's 1819 *Zhang Yuan liangyou xianglun* 張遠兩友相論 was "probably the most frequently reprinted Chinese novel of any kind during the century" (60). Hanan discusses fiction written by Karl Gützlaff (1803-1851), James Legge (1815-1897), and Timothy Richard's literary language translation of Edward Bellamy's 1888 novel *Looking Backward, 2000-1887*. The latter appeared in installments 1891-1894 as *Huitou kan jilue* 回頭看紀略; its influence is clear in Liang Qichao's 梁啟超 *Xin Zhongguo weilai ji* 新中國未來記 of 1902.

Chapter 4, "The First Novel Translated Into Chinese," describes *Xinxi xiantan* 昕夕閒談, published serially from 1873 to 1875 as the "earliest translation of a novel of general interest" (85). Drawn from the first half of an Edward Bulwer Lytton (1803-1873) novel, *Night and Morning* (1841), it seems to have been the work of Jiang Zhixiang 蔣芷湘 (Jiang Qizhang 蔣其章, b. 1842; *jinshi* 1877) while he was a senior editor at *Shen bao* 申報 in Shanghai. As a *Bildungsroman* with a sympathetic criminal protagonist set in various European cities, the translation adapted Chinese fictional techniques to a limited degree while providing information about these exotic places. But because the novel was twenty years premature for any widespread interest in foreign cultures, it provoked very little response. It would also be another twenty years before the serial publication of fiction would become common. In Chapter 5, "The Translated Fiction in the Early *Shen Bao*," Hanan examines the European narratives that appeared in this influential periodical starting from 1872. Most were given the form of traditional *zhiguai xiaoshuo* 志怪小說. Texts so rendered included segments of *Gulliver's Travels*, the Rip Van Winkle story, and Frederick Marryat's (1792-1848) *Pacha of Many Tales* (a parody of *The Thousand and One Nights*). Probably all were produced by *Shen bao* editor Ernest Major and Jiang Zhixiang, his assistant. Hanan provides illuminating contrasts between these renditions and Lin Shu's 林紓 (1852-1924) better known translations dating from 1899.

Chapter 6 traces a probably quite influential contest held by John Fryer (1839-1928) to produce a "new" Chinese novel, *shixin xiaoshuo* 時新小說, that could provide remedies for the three greatest social problems of the time—opium use, the civil service examination system, and footbinding. Fryer had been a resident of China since 1861, working primarily as Head of the Translation Bureau at the Jiangnan Arsenal, but later he established his own bookstore, through which he announced his 1895 contest—in response to the widespread outrage over the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Fryer thus introduced the idea of addressing national concerns in fiction. Twenty winners were selected from 162 submissions. None were ever published; Fryer left in 1896 to take a professorship in Chinese at University of California, Berkeley. But several novels produced soon afterward refer to the contest as their inspiration. Foremost among them was *Xichao kuaishi*, the "earliest modern" novel discussed in Chapter 1.

"The Second Stage of Vernacular Translation," Chapter 7, notes that there were no complete translations of Western novels from *Xinxi xiantan* until 1902, when the

works of Arthur Conan Doyle, Jules Verne, and others began to appear. The most prolific translators were Zhou Guisheng 周桂笙 (1863-1926) and Liang Qichao. Zhou translated to colloquial, rather than the classical style utilized by missionary publications previously. Liang used a composite style for a Verne novel about 15 youthful castaways; his choice reflected his concern with education and his conviction that his countrymen had “no interest whatever in adventure and discovery” (147). Among the foreign adventure (*maoxian* 冒險) and detective (*zhentan* 偵探) fiction translated around 1900, several had the “blind opening” that was later to distinguish Wu Jianren’s 吳趼人 *Jiuming qi yuan* 九命奇冤 of 1904. In his Chapter 8, “Wu Jianren and the Narrator,” Hanan supports his claim that Wu was the “best example of the change to the modern in Chinese literature” (162) by exploring his range of experimentation with the novel form. Despite his conservative social values, Wu had no hesitation in adapting the form of his narratives to their content. Hanan concentrates on Wu’s range of narrators in *Ershi nian mudu zhi gua xianzhuang* 二十年目睹之怪現狀 (1903-10), *Xin Shitou ji* 新石頭記 (1905-08), and *Shanghai youcan lu* 上海游驂錄 (1907).

Chapter 9, “Specific Literary Relations of *Sea of Regret*,” addresses Wu Jianren’s 1906 novel *Henhai* 恨海, which he dashed off in ten days. Although Wu claimed not to know why he wrote it, Hanan reveals parallels and contrasts with other novels concerning the Boxer incidents and gender relations. Wu’s purpose was to demonstrate conservative alternatives to the free choice in love and marriage advocated by some of them; this novel presents *qing* 情 as moral passion based on self-denial. Even so, by narrating his action through the minds of characters, Wu portrayed fear with unprecedented effectiveness (187). If Wu wrote from passion for social causes, Chen Diexian 陳蝶仙 (1879-1940) wrote repeatedly about his own frustrated affairs of the heart. Chen grew up in a wealthy Hangzhou family where he fell in love with a cousin and a family friend. His several interrelated works of fiction are the subject of Hanan’s Chapter 10; Chen’s were among the most popular novels during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The longest is *Huangjin sui* 黃金崇 (*The Money Demon* in Hanan’s rendition), published in 1913; this and his 1915 *Ta zhi xiaoshi* 他之小史 appeared just as *yuanyang hudie pai* 鴛鴦蝴蝶派 fiction was gaining popularity and may have inspired the trend.

Chapter 11 is “The Technique of Lu Xun’s Fiction.” Despite his avowed dedication to “ideas of social purpose and efficacy of literature,” Lu Xun (1881-1936) was “uncommonly concerned” with literary technique (217). To buttress this conclusion, Hanan surveys the extensive collaborative efforts between Lu Xun and his brother Zhou Zuoren 周作人 in reading and translating European fiction. Hanan also observes that fiction by the younger writer Xu Qinwen 許欽文 inspired Lu Xun’s stories to a limited degree. Then he demonstrates the parallels between elements of these stories and Lu Xun’s own: his uses of irony, types of narrators, attraction to symbolism, and avoidance of realism. Hanan concludes with a line that still is as instructive as it was when it was first written: “Irony and the mask are the best means

of coping with any strong emotion that threatens to overwhelm the artist, a point that Lu Xun was almost alone in grasping, among the writers of his generation” (245).

The quality of the end matter here matches the scholarship of its separate chapters. The extensive “Works Cited” (251-267) includes both readily available editions of many old works and the locations of rare texts. This volume also has a thorough and very helpful “Glossary” (269-276). Its “Index” is similarly detailed and useful (277-285).

Speaking generally, this is not a book for the beginner. Hanan seldom identifies the major texts he discusses (such as *Honglou meng*); he does not give dates for famous writers like Lu Xun. Nor does he explain why the Treaty of Shimonoseki provoked such outrage in China. He self-consciously addresses his essays to those who already know a great deal about the period under discussion. Instead of repeating the work of previous scholars he builds on common knowledge to complicate standard interpretations of late Qing fiction. He looks carefully where others have only glanced, and he questions texts that previous scholars have generally ignored. This is what makes the contribution of his collection so important: he defamiliarizes late Qing fiction by significantly broadening the textual scope of study. Here as in his research on earlier novels and stories, Hanan offers insights that will be seminal for further critical interpretations. We cannot but acknowledge the experimentation of late Qing writers, and that it was Hanan who demonstrated many of their accomplishments.

Illuminations from the Past: Trauma, Memory, and History in Modern China. By Ban Wang. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. x + 311.

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Through a discussion of many of China’s writers and film-makers across the twentieth century, Ban Wang argues that much cultural production of the 1980s and ’90s reflected two traumatic events: first, the Cultural Revolution; second, the onslaught of capitalist globalization and the transition to a mass consumerist society. In Wang’s own words, he is “reexamining the historical imagination embedded in aesthetic discourse as psychic and narrative responses to traumatic memories” (11). Chinese artists thus produced historical works in the sense of reflecting upon history, though obviously not the kinds of histories produced by professional historians (which Wang does not consider). Wang points out that the entire twentieth century was highly traumatic as traditional society crumbled in war and revolution and attempts to create a new society fell short of their utopian goals, to say the least. Chinese artists were thus able to use memory (or perhaps compelled to use memory) in an effort to suggest alternatives to the status quo. They could not and did not want to escape history but

rather participated in historical discourse; they created a complex “critical historical consciousness” (5) that both offered a basis for critiques of the supposedly natural world of tradition and memory, and also allowed for the recovery of memory and even nostalgia in order to critique the existing order.

For Wang, this “existing order” by the end of the twentieth century was marked by a historical teleology now dominant in both the West and China that posits an increasingly universal trajectory toward markets, liberal capitalism, a prosperous middle class, civil society, and more markets and economic growth, under the benign governance of global capitalism: the end of history. This is not a vision Wang finds appealing (nor do I), though it is not clear whether his main objection is that it masks the lie of imperialist hegemony or that, even if its utopian promises were somehow realized, it would turn into another dystopia or exact too high a price. One price, he implies, would be the loss of community, identity and memory, at least living memory of the lived past or tradition. Contemporary globalization, in Wang’s view, is a kind of continuation of the unilinear version of modernization theory that anti-colonial and socialist movements had, in an earlier generation, challenged but that now reigns supreme. Indeed, globalization is not only the gospel of the West but a goal toward which China’s political leaders and most of its elites are striving.¹

However, Wang’s purpose is not to analyze globalization but to show how a (good) “historical consciousness that critiques the engrained historical narrative [the bad teleology of globalization] via memory will keep alive unfinished possibilities and unfulfilled dreams anticipating different lines of horizon—memories of the future” (3). The book thus highlights the achievements of Chinese artists who offer a critique of their society, a critique that might be useful for other societies as well. This is also Wang’s purpose: in his own words he seeks “to brush history against the engrained historical discourse in modern China by evoking memories of alternative bypaths and substrata” (3). In other words, Wang finds hope in memory.

It is worth noting Wang’s own stake in the Chinese debates over globalization. He writes not simply as an outside observer but as a Chinese intellectual, although one working in the United States. If there is an implicit anxiety in this book over the survival of Chinese culture, the difficulty in defining that culture, and a certain loss of human values in China today, this should not be surprising. Some of Wang’s remarks echo the dilemmas earlier explored by May Fourth intellectuals and still, clearly, unresolved, such as whether or how elements of tradition should contribute to contemporary Chinese identity, how people’s spiritual needs can be met in an essentially materialistic society, and even how China is to achieve its just role on the

¹ As numerous observers have noted, the new legitimacy of the Chinese government rests on promises of enrichment, not socialism or indeed politics of any kind; the convergence with global capitalism is presented as normal, natural, and inevitable. See Rebecca E. Karl, “‘Joining Tracks with the World’: The Impossibility of Politics in China,” *Radical Philosophy* 131 (May/June 2005): 8-15.

world stage.

My remarks above are not meant as criticism, and Wang's subject-position not only does not detract from his scholarship but enriches it.² Wang's approach allows him to make a number of insightful and useful observations about cultural production in China over the last generation. The book is divided into three sections, beginning with an interpretation of May Fourth iconoclasm that emphasizes its roots in both Enlightenment universalism and, more originally, in "native folk cultural resources" (12) as well. The second section discusses the uses of history in the wake of the Cultural Revolution through the remembrance of trauma, which led to attempts to rework traditional myths. The final section focuses on the effects of globalization, particularly the commodification of culture, in the 1990s, arguing that a particular form of memory work, nostalgia, acts like a form of resistance. This is to cover a lot of ground, and to make it manageable, Wang focuses on Lu Xun, Wang Anyi, and Tian Zhuangzhuang, with briefer analyses of many other artists. In what follows, I will take up a few of the themes Wang raises, not so much to criticize but in the spirit of conversation and debate.

What is "memory"? On the one hand, Wang seems to follow Pierre Nora in emphasizing the link between traditional societies and a kind of natural memory or community of memory.³ In this view, memory in modern societies is particularized, partial: it is oppressed both by history as a rational system-building narrative and by kitsch as memory itself is commodified. Yet Wang acknowledges that even modern societies retain real memories. This is why dealing with memories of the Cultural Revolution became central to cultural production in China in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, a rare source of hope for Wang is our ability to recover memories even in the present-day environment. In valuing memory in this way, Wang understands "history" as an ambiguous or largely negative force. History seems to represent the deadening hand of official, hegemonic teleologies, rationalization and universalization, the very denial of memory—even while "critical historical consciousness" also offers ways to critique the status quo, even the seemingly naturalized narratives of memory. It is not clear to me exactly what Wang means by critical historical consciousness, much less how it is to be fostered outside of willed

² Wang has discussed this issue in his first book, *The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. vii-ix. As for my own subject-position, I have neither the level of involvement nor the degree of knowledge possessed by Wang. What I can offer here, perhaps, is the perspective of a double outsider—most importantly as a student of modern history, I hope to present questions that come from outside the field of literature narrowly defined. Given the "discursive" (in the sense of a wide-ranging discussion of numerous topics) nature of Wang's work is comparative in the sense he positions Chinese writing and films vis-à-vis questions formed by Lukàcs, Jameson, Marx, Adorno, and, as his title implies, Benjamin, among other Western thinkers.

³ Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), vol. 1, pp. 1-20.

acts of remembering against the grain of teleology. Such acts, I would agree, are admirable, but memory itself is hardly infallible. Wang is well aware of the limits of memory, and, as he concludes, memory and history are needed to check each other (5-9). However, Wang says little about how this could be done, or specifically how good and bad memory and history should be distinguished.⁴

But why link memory and hope in this way in the first place? In my view, memory does not offer understanding but represents primary experience that needs further thought in order to become meaningful. Of course, without memory to check it, history may well fall into various sorts of error, but “raw” memory offers only glimpses of the past. Like it or not, raw memory must be interpreted and, ideally, worked through. Furthermore, memory in the sense of lived traditions, while nostalgically appealing, seems to me a lost cause and in some cases even immoral. A lost cause because we are all now cosmopolitans, and, while we may lay claims to dual and other forms of multilayered identities or “hybridity,” rational persons can no longer believe in purity. In other words, we can no longer believe in the naïve stories groups have traditionally told about themselves. And immoral—at least sometimes—precisely because efforts to escape into an imagined *Gemeinschaft* are likely to result in an intolerant fundamentalism. In-group “memories” have formed the basis of the great crimes of the last century. At the least, the role of traditions and the memory-work that sustains them is problematic in a crowded, if not necessarily globalized world.

As for other social functions of memory, how much hope does memory really offer? Should we not allow ourselves to rage, mourn, even despair? Evidently, Wang sees hope in resistance, and history/memory as a source of resistance. He puts it cautiously: “The backward look, suspicious of the process of globalization, tries to resurrect, nostalgically and critically, a livable past against the end-of-history mythology” (8). But since, as Wang says, the twentieth century has been so traumatic, it seems to me to follow that hope is not there simply to be picked up. Wang emphasizes the centrality of trauma to the modern condition, but this raises two further questions. First, if trauma is everywhere and many experiences are traumatic, then it becomes a background noise, part of the general disorientation of modern life, rather than the singular experience that throws everything into doubt. Second, what we do with trauma matters terribly. Wang follows contemporary theory in emphasizing that trauma is literally inexplicable and fragments narratives that attempt to deal with it. However, the need to work through trauma remains: if repressed, it returns. The critical question for Chinese intellectuals and artists, then, is whether they are doomed

⁴ The issue is examined more systematically, precisely in these terms, by Dominick LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 8-42. Overall, Wang seems to distrust history, at least in the form of narratives of continuity, while he also thinks we should, instead, treat it as a “source of memory and hope” (7). I will say more about Wang’s reflexive distrust of “teleology” below.

to repeat traumatic experience or if they can work through it to some kind of resolution, however partial.

But at the beginning of the twenty-first century, what is the nature of *China's* trauma? In other words, is China special? Were its twentieth-century traumas worse than those of, say, France? Or of the West generally? Violence came to Europe in the twentieth century, after a century of relative peace (violence having been exported, as it were, through colonization). And the late-twentieth century traumas of globalization are universal, as Wang acknowledges. Of course, from the mid-nineteenth century on, China was not only a victim of imperialist wars and civil wars all the way through the Cultural Revolution, but it also experienced the near total loss of the traditional orientational order, particularly Confucianism in the social and political realms, much more quickly than the West was de-Christianized, and, unlike the West, China has yet to find a new orientational order or national identity that seems comfortable or stable.⁵ In terms of the second, contemporary set of traumas, a critical factor is precisely the failure in China in the twentieth century to establish a stable orientational order, thus leaving open a space for globalization to claim to represent a force for good, however empty its promises turn out to be. In the case of China, that globalization also represents for many elites the chance to achieve the century-old objectives of national “wealth and power” explains much of its appeal, even while nationalism and globalization may seem to make uneasy bed partners. The point here is that globalization offers an escape from traumatic memories.

However, there is a moral problem that emerges when Wang—and Chinese intellectuals generally—discuss trauma with no reference to the widespread famine of the Great Leap Forward (GLF). The entire nation suffered terribly from 1960 to 1962, and estimates of deaths from starvation range from an astounding twenty million to as high as forty million persons.⁶ Yet the dead were mostly peasants, while intellectuals, like all urban dwellers, were relatively unaffected and even today have taken little note of the famine.⁷ Wang is right—reflecting the facts of cultural production—to discuss

⁵ This is not to deny that signs of spiritual crisis can be found in the “West,” which is also hardly unitary but must be divided among a secular Western Europe, a still highly Christian if confused United States, and an economically-striving Eastern Europe. Still, the West at least subjectively thinks it makes its own history, while China still feels much of its history is being imposed on it, which no doubts contributes to its traumatization. Interestingly, despite (or because of?) the enormous amount of memory work done in the last two decades on the Holocaust, only a few intellectuals have suggested the Holocaust throws fundamental Western values into doubt, and this notion has even less traction in popular culture.

⁶ Jasper Becker, *Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine* (New York: The Free Press, 1997). The exact figures are obviously irrelevant to my argument.

⁷ This may be beginning to change. See Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “Trauma and Memory: The Case of the Great Famine in the People's Republic of China (1959-1961),” *Historiography East and West* 1.1 (2003): 36-67.

the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, which of course affected artists and intellectuals disproportionately, but any discussion of China's traumas must take the GLF into account. Indeed, the book would benefit from a fuller discussion of intellectuals' reactions to the countryside, the backwardness of which came as a shock in the late 1960s. Chen Kaige's 陳凱歌 film *Yellow Earth* 黃土地 not only, as Wang correctly notes, used telling camera techniques to highlight "the nightmare, grotesqueries, and stagnation of China's past" (247), but also reflected the urbanite's horror of the countryside.

Wang's suggestion that memory is a kind of "enabling" faculty that may even aid in the "reenchantment" of the everyday puts a large burden on memory. It also rests on the assumption that "previously 'organic' communities" (181-182) once existed before they were destroyed by globalization. To make this assumption is to engage in the very nostalgia that is the subject of Wang's analysis. More convincingly, Wang argues that Taiwan and Hong Kong felt the cold thrills of global capital earlier than China, and a few artists recorded the resulting "damaged life" (185). Wang emphasizes that the Taiwanese writer Zhu Tianwen 朱天文 does not only record the deadening of urban life that consumerism results in, but that she also offers an image of our longing for our childhood village. Yet Wang fails to stress sufficiently, it seems to me, that Zhu is not herself indulging in nostalgia. As he points out, the childhood village was not an idyllic place in Zhu's fiction; furthermore, her characters seem to achieve at best a momentary respite or escape rather than finding any so-called reenchanting world. To my mind, then, Zhu's use of nostalgia is hardly an alternative to the status quo but another symptom of its barrenness. Similarly, *Autumn Moon* 秋月 by Clara Law 羅卓瑤 may highlight the utter barrenness of contemporary Hong Kong partly through a contrast to the figure of the grandmother and the ruins of an old fishing village, but this is scarcely to present the past as a living force, capable of renewal. Rather than saying that nostalgia "refuses to submit to the current trend of globalization" (211), we might say that nostalgia is a symptom of globalization, and even that its melancholy pleasures make globalization sustainable.⁸

This would explain the rise of an entire nostalgia industry that, as Wang notes, is occurring in China today. Thus indeed Wang Anyi's 王安憶 recent turn toward memory and nostalgia can be explained as a mourning for a familiar lifeworld fast receding from view" (217), a world under attack by the forces of modernization/globalization. However, the question remains what resources of the past, whether imagined ("nostalgia" in my definition) or real (memory) can be summoned in the defense of the familiar. Of course, facing the lies of governments, the media, and capital, individuals and groups can imagine alternatives by recalling the past. Indeed, using the past to criticize the present has its own venerable history: and has marked reactionary platforms rather than progressive ones at least since the French

⁸ As Ban Wang himself notes elsewhere of Wang Anyi's *Song of Unending Sorrow* 長恨歌: "... [T]he narrative of nostalgia both affirms and critiques the rush to the market" (224).

Revolution. I would argue that an accurate—dare I say scientific?—knowledge of history does much more to define what progressive alternatives might be realistic than can memory work, at least by itself. I thus agree with Wang’s decision to end his book on a hopeful note through a discussion of the recovery of cinematic realism and the “documentary impulse” in films like Wu Wenguang’s 吳文光 *The Wide Earth* 江湖, Jia Zhangke’s 賈樟柯 *The Pickpocket* 小武, and Lou Ye’s 婁燁 *Suzhou River* 蘇州河.

Wang defends the “Enlightenment narrative” of May Fourth from putatively postmodern critics who emphasize its tensions, repressions, and links to the past. Indeed, Wang is critical of the larger “critique of the Enlightenment narrative of progress and revolution” (19), even if he is scarcely an unabashed spokesman for the Enlightenment. Wang’s concern is two-fold. First, that we forget the value of Enlightenment universalism in protecting individual rights. And second, that we forget the value of nationalism as a tool of resistance against imperialism and a legitimate expression of sheer survival. At this level of generalization, Wang’s views seem to me to be unexceptionable. Western colonialism can be said to have rested on the will to ignore the universal values of the Enlightenment rather than the desire to fulfill them. However, one problem facing both would-be critics of the Enlightenment and its supporters is that there were many Enlightenments: many strikingly different opinions expressed by self-proclaimed *philosophes*. Some supported aristocracy, theology, and hierarchies of class, gender, and race, and abhorred any talk of equality and republicanism. Yet radical statements explicitly favoring democracy, egalitarianism, self-determination, liberty, and tolerance can be found by the late seventeenth century. This “radical Enlightenment” won debates but never won the war—until our own times when its moral values have in fact become widely accepted.⁹ As for Chinese nationalism, Wang’s defense seems unnecessary: few scholars would deny that it was a necessary response defined not only by imperialism but the nation-state system.¹⁰

⁹ Even if tainted by their association with rampant marketization, “atomistic” individualism, and excessive property rights. See Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁰ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) remains useful on the revolutionary effects of the international nation-state system. In this regard, Wang’s attack on Prasenjit Duara’s *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) rests on a misreading of Duara (19-22); Duara does not in fact blame “nationalism” for later Chinese “authoritarianism”—a teleological argument his methodology precludes in any case—but simply shows, in specific cases, how hegemonic forms of nationalist discourse eliminated alternatives. True, as Wang, following Rebecca Karl (*Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism and the Turn of the Twentieth Century* [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002]), argues, it is a theoretical mistake to confuse the vibrant nation with deadening statism, which blinds us to a particular historical contingency (located in the late Qing, not May Fourth, I would argue), but it is also a historical mistake to ignore the actual

To put it baldly, Wang wants to rescue “May Fourth” from Maoism, where he seems to think a Foucauldian genealogical approach leaves it. He would deny, I infer, a fundamental contradiction between May Fourth nationalism and May Fourth enlightenment radicalism. And he specifically denies that May Fourth historical consciousness, even in using an “Enlightenment narrative,” is simply “another mimicry of the European narrative” (26). None of these views seem problematic to me, though none of them seem particularly startling. Lu Xun 魯迅 is Wang’s example of critical historical consciousness.

The real problem with Wang’s analysis here lies in his efforts to turn Lu Xun into the voice of both Enlightenment and traditionalism. In fact, Lu fits comfortably into neither camp, especially the latter. Wang emphasizes that Lu criticized capitalist modernity, opposed promiscuous Westernization, supported the autonomous rationality of the Enlightenment, and also believed in the expressive individualism of the Romantic movement. All this is true enough, but that Lu’s view were “predicated on a communal ethic,” that he thought “the whole society should strive . . . to become an organic community” (41), or that this supposed communalism rested on a traditional ethic (43)—none of these propositions is convincing. The role of “memory” in Lu was, at least *primarily*, to define the enemy. Wang and other critics have found in Lu traces of nostalgia, interest in the past, and of course a lived life marked by a still-traditional society; however, as Wang also remarks, Lu’s basic views were rooted in Enlightenment values and—I would add—rationality. His individualism represented not just a personality ideal but a misanthropic disdain for the mob.¹¹ Any communalist traces that might be found in Lu are not typical of his thought, and nor can they be offered as evidence of some strategic traditionalism. For Wang to speak of Lu’s “utopian impulse” seems to say more about Wang than Lu. Lu’s own traumatic, repetitively nightmarish narratives, as Wang well describes, may not preclude all hope but they certainly leave no room for utopianism. In my view, Lu’s refusal to indulge in escapism of any kind marks his special place in modern world literature.

Lu’s “tragic vision,” also found in one form or another at the time from thinkers like Wang Guowei 王國維 to the early Shanghai film-makers, perhaps fed into the post-Maoist attempts to deal with the traumas of the Cultural Revolution in the 1980s. The temptation to turn to highly private forms of liberal humanism at the expense of collective historical experience is well described in this book, and Wang also outlines how a number of artists were able to express (partially), and then use, traumatized memories to challenge official history. First, the “searching for roots” (*xungen* 尋根) and “scar” (*shanghen* 傷痕) literature expressed this trauma in fairly

state-building thrust of Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century.

¹¹ See Jon Kowallis, “Lu Xun and Terrorism: A Reading of Revenge and Violence in *Mara and Beyond*,” in Peter Zarrow, ed., *Creating Chinese Modernity: Knowledge and Everyday Life* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 83-98; Lung-kee Sun, *The Chinese National Character: From Nationhood to Individuality* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 117-44.

direct ways. Then, more reflective attempts to understand the entire Maoist period began to emerge.¹² Wang highlights the importance of equal rights and global justice (a form of Enlightenment ideals, that is) in the works of Wang Anyi and other writers. Wang also credits *Blue Kite* 藍風箏 of 1993, a film that I think has been unjustly criticized elsewhere, with what in effect is a working through, rather than an uncontrolled repetition, of the trauma of the Cultural Revolution.

Whilst I agree with Wang's praise for the work of the fifth-generation film directors, this does raise the question of the relationship between their work and what came before and after. In terms of the structure of the book, Wang grants historical consciousness to the May Fourth generation broadly defined (up to Eileen Chang 張愛玲) and to post-Mao artists, but entirely ignores the Maoist years.¹³ The effect is to imply a kind of continuity, or at least a family resemblance, between the cultural production of early and late decades of the twentieth century. The dismissal of the culture of Maoist period as teleological and non-critical, returns us to the view that the "proper course" of Chinese history was interrupted. Furthermore, one can see, I believe, how the first attempts to excavate the then-hidden horrors of the Maoist period, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, prepared the way for the supposed normalization (with Chinese characteristics) of the 1990s.

It is certainly understandable that Wang condemns teleology. But actually what he means by teleology is two specific teleologies: Maoist revolutionism and contemporary end-of-history neo-liberalism. The first is a dead horse, though of course it is correct to note the historical harm it caused. The second, as I will suggest below, is also less overwhelming than it may seem at the moment. More important for his analysis though, Wang actually is sympathetic to what might be called "soft" teleologies of progress. His defense of universal ideals does not necessarily depend on a belief in their inevitable triumph; nor does his defense of the "grand narrative" of nationalism imply any final product of history. Nonetheless, if we grant a positive value to the potential of resistance of such morally and practically ambiguous forces as nostalgia, the same must be done for teleology. Indeed, insofar as neo-liberalism wishes to naturalize itself, so to speak, it must deny all earlier teleologies, simultaneously suppressing their memories and magnifying their traumas.

Traumatized memories are, by definition, difficult to control. But if artists are responding to trauma, in what sense are they in control of their material? Wang refers to the "creative configuration of memory" and "creative acts" (3), but overall he treats cultural production as the outcome of social forces. The rise of nostalgia that Wang detects in the 1990s "was *symptomatic* of epochal changes in the preceding two decades" (212, my italics). "These developments spawned the themes of memory in

¹² See Jing Wang, *High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng's China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

¹³ The role of art in the Maoist years is a theme of Wang's first book, *The Sublime Figure of History*.

contemporary literature” (218). It may be that historical materialism still has much to teach us, but what is missing here is an analysis of *how* artists are able to do more than recycle memory. Certainly, more could be said about the problems of too much memory: kitsch, loss of control, and sentimentality. If artists are to illuminate the often devastating effects of external forces on people’s lives, of course memory is an important tool, but broader perspectives are also needed.

Indeed, when Wang attempts to analyze the social forces to which artists are responding, his broad depiction of sociopolitical conditions, though accurate in a rough way, is not worked out in convincing detail.¹⁴ I wonder if, for Wang and the contemporary artists he is discussing, a fixation on globalization may be blinding them to equally important if less obvious forces. There is also, as Wang recognizes in places, the moral dilemma of seeming to condemn what millions of ordinary people legitimately desire: clean places to shop, a variety of goods to buy, the relaxation offered by mindless leisure pursuits. Intellectual alienation cannot justify intellectual snobbishness.

Insofar as Wang positions himself as a critic of globalization, even while acknowledging the importance of economic growth through international trade and technology, he attacks the “homogenization” and “flattening” that result from globalization—in other words, the spread of the mass-consumer society. However, there is a logical fall in this analysis. If the claims of the globalists are right, there is no way to block it; however, if, as I and Wang believe, these claims are wrong, then globalism is not the threat that it first appears to be. Granted, globalization at the moment is a powerful ideology, but history is not in fact unilinear and China is not going to turn into Scarsdale. Indeed, it may be that globalization has run its course.¹⁵ Less radically, as John Gray has recently noted, the term “globalization” has come to refer to two distinct phenomena.¹⁶ There is no doubt of the increasing pace of technological innovation, its spread, and the resulting linkages throughout the world. However, there are good reasons to doubt these linkages are in fact creating a single worldwide economic system—much less dampening the struggles among nations and religious sects. The spread of capitalism thus marks the precise opposite of the “end of history”: it creates new concentrations of wealth that will probably be accompanied by further war and revolution as they were in the past, especially given new environmental limits. If neo-liberal utopianism presents a false teleology, however, that does not make disaster inevitable. Rather, we have a chance to make rational political decisions to deal with the dilemmas globalization presents: in effect to manage globalization. As Wang says, the ability to imagine alternatives is crucial here; however, I doubt that utopianism and nostalgia offer useful alternatives.

¹⁴ One historical mistake: the National Essence School (Guocui pai 國粹派) at the turn of the twentieth century was not particularly Confucian, nor did it believe in “timeless” anything (5).

¹⁵ John Ralston Saul, *The Collapse of Globalism* (London: Atlantic Books, 2005).

¹⁶ John Gray, “The World Is Round,” *New York Review of Books* 52.13 (August 11, 2005): 13-15.

Mencius on Becoming Human. By James Behuniak Jr. Albany: SUNY Press, 2005. Pp. xxviii + 186.

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James Behuniak's recent book takes on an ambitious and interesting project, central to which is the elucidation of the meaning of *xing* 性 (here translated as "dispositions"), which the author takes to imply a positive program for self-cultivation. Reading the text in light of the metaphysical assumptions of texts unearthed at Guodian, Behuniak sees *xing* as the ever-changing product of an individual's interaction with her/his environment, which implies a mutual influence of individual and world. He argues that the usual understanding of the term depends on essential or teleological nature of members of a species, and errs precisely because it neglects Mencius' 孟子 emphasis on this interaction, and therefore fails to emphasize the unique process by which a thing develops based on its cultural history and social conditions, a process which for humans begins with socialization within the family. Behuniak's contributions to the discussion of cultivation in the *Mencius* are many, but he ultimately fails to defend the idea of uniqueness of the individual as the source of human value for Mencius.

Behuniak conscientiously draws on texts of the period in order to help elucidate terms and ideas in the *Mencius* by identifying common metaphysical assumptions, and relies heavily on the Guodian findings, especially "Dispositions Arise from Conditions" ("Xing zi ming chu" 性自命出, already controversial in his translation of the title). Behuniak spends the first chapter describing the two underlying claims of Chinese cosmology: because *qi* 氣 manifests itself in terms of both form and function, there can be no strict division between the two, nor between being and its expression; secondly, these thinkers consequently focus on process rather than being—in other words, for them, there are no fixed objects, only momentary manifestations of a process, hence dispositions are not given or constant, but are formed in commerce with the environment.

Behuniak in Chapter Two turns to describing the desired end result of Mencian cultivation: feelings that are spontaneous and appropriate responses to the situation at hand. He contributes a valuable discussion of feeling (*xin* 心, often translated as "heart-mind") as the most reliable guide to moral action, picturing Mencius as arguing against the Mohists and others who take doctrine to provide an adequate and reliable guide to action, taking a "technical" approach and evaluating morality by a fixed standard. Feeling, as a particular person's response to a circumstance, can capture what doctrine does not; texts like the *Mencius* and *Greater Learning* 大學 pair feeling and thoughtfulness, which seems to require active involvement on the part of the person, and circumvents the interference of doctrine in a person's response to the world. Also, guidance by feelings of associated life (*ren* 仁) and appropriateness (*yi* 義) provide an

opportunity for the further exercise and development of moral feeling.

Behuniak emphasizes that virtuous action, being the product of extension of feelings generated within the family, ultimately relies on the familial and social, so that “moral sense is ultimately a social sense” (35). Interestingly, he suggests that the four sprouts come from family experience (xvi and 88), and are not present in a newborn child. Further, the extended feelings recommended by the *Mencius* are not the result of an intellectual process, being similar in kind to family feeling but with wider scope, thus providing a model for the way in which a person can develop her/his moral sense beyond the static dictates of moral rule. Behuniak compares this extension of feeling to the hypothetical people who, discovering that their unburied parents were beset by flies and wolves, were moved not by existing dictates of propriety but by emotion to cover their bodies with earth.

Further, Behuniak sees the dependence of moral sense on social feeling reflected in Mencius’ emphasis on self-examination. To be able to reflect upon the morality of one’s action, and of one’s treatment of others—to be able to recognize other people’s concerns and reactions—one must be affectively linked to others in a community. Behuniak sees this care for others as maintaining a person’s original integration (*cheng* 誠, usually translated as “genuineness”) of inner with outer—individual dispositions and concerns with the social world—and once a person is so established, he can continue to develop his disposition and positively affect the social world despite often contrary social forces. The satisfaction attendant on becoming human is due to what Behuniak ascribes to Mencius as the integration of inner (presumably here meaning “disposition”) and outer (presumably the social), the physical manifestation of *qi*, and the aesthetic pleasures of harmony, which in a family requires that each play a different role.

Behuniak’s main argument against a teleological interpretation of *xing* arrives in Chapter Four, where he intends to prove that human’s *xing* consists of (and comes from) more than genetically-given drives for food and sex, demonstrating that humanity is more than biological. To assert that a human disposition’s development through filiality and other human relationships is biologically pre-determined is to contradict the fundamental idea of a *qi* cosmology—that formation and functioning always happen simultaneously, the one influencing the other. If endorsing the implications of this, we need to allow that social and cultural factors act upon the biological, forming a disposition that is more than biological. Further evidence for this claim appears in 3A4, where Mencius reproaches Chanxiang for abandoning the five relationships established by Xie 契 under Yao’s 堯 rule, the historical province of the story suggesting that the ability to form these essential family and social ties is not merely biological but rather dependent on a particular historical event.

Any project which aspires to provide a practical interpretation of aspiration and cultivation in the *Mencius* must diverge from previous interpretations, which largely do not recognize this potential in this text. In so doing, the author risks introducing innovations which do not serve to further his project. Behuniak’s not unprecedented

translation of *xin* as “feelings” emphasizes the identity of object and function that Behuniak so clearly wants to stress, and in this case seems a felicitous choice, though the reader would benefit from a description of the difference between this and “emotion” (*qing* 情). However, not all of his divergences from standard translations compensate for the jarring effect of his nonstandard choices. Most disturbing is his choice of “conditions” for *ming* 命. The usual translation, “fate”, contains a component of the ineluctable circumstances one confronts, and with which one must come to terms, willing or not. “Conditions,” on the other hand, often change of themselves, and do not imply the same difficulties as “fate.” Wanting to avoid the connotations of the biologically given, Behuniak chooses a term that erases the suggestion that circumstances, even those of one’s birth and rearing, are often beyond one’s control. However, without better reason, this choice seems mistaken, the result being that everything, even past events, seems controvertible.

Behuniak is right to avoid the claim that for Mencius human nature is solely genetic, but he seems to overstate his case, denying any biological component. Describing the four sprouts of virtue as originating in family life eliminates one of the more important distinctions between Xunzi and Mencius, making the tendency to virtue seem to be something that humans do not originally possess, and undermining the idea that the *Mencius* presents a developmental account of virtue.

Also, in the *Mencius* there seem to be two notions of the human: the one requiring cultivation of the virtues, which allows Mencius to regard as “beastly” or “less than human” those who neglect duty to family or ruler; the other, apparently biological, which is necessary if Mencius is to be able to encourage those who have not yet attained this moral humanity, or to condemn those who have abandoned it. However, Behuniak downplays the tension between humanity as an achievement and humanity as a simple given which carries with it the capacity—and requirement—for self-cultivation. As noted above, this erasure is evident in his choice of translation for *ming*, but also, Behuniak discounts the idea of biological humanity even to the point of being forced to claim that Mencius’ reason for talking about shared traits is only polemical, to discredit the Mohists and Yangists (96).

For the Mencian project to succeed, it seems essential to assert that those with human form are also endowed with certain tendencies prior to socialization—as Behuniak suggests in saying that Xie, in establishing family structures, helped those under Yao’s rule to realize the capacity to flourish—which is neglected if one does not aspire to Confucian virtue. Else, Mencius cannot encourage any who do not already care for virtue to become virtuous. Nonetheless, Behuniak’s project of finding human value in something other than human teleology requires that he repudiate all essential characteristics of the human, social or biological. While he claims to find a value that is social but not essential, he equivocates on whether all humans would do best to realize the values instantiated in the families of Warring States China, suggesting, for example, that Xie’s actions allowed humans to become morally human for the first time.

Either Behuniak must accept that there are some common human traits, and on these base the possibility of interaction between systems of virtues; or else he must accept that the family structure of Warring States China produces virtues that are specific to that limited social sphere. He never entirely endorses either of these options, believing that the fact of rearing within the family is a sufficiently common trait to ground commonality of virtue, and wanting to find guidance in Mencius' China, but yet denying common components in human biology. Nevertheless, were he to choose the former, he would even so have limited grounds on which to recommend any particular method of cultivation. Basing all virtue on *ren* only, the guidance Behuniak sees in the *Mencius* is limited to virtue in relation to others, excluding things like Confucius' appreciation of music.

Further, while Behuniak emphasizes the fact that value in the *Mencius* comes from the uniqueness of an individual developing his particular disposition, the uniqueness of a disposition does not suffice to give positive value to this development. Not all outcomes of development are equally desirable, but only those that fall within Mencian virtues. Though Behuniak suggests that the fate of a tree cut down to provide firewood might be as noble as one that survives upright to great age, Mencius' discussion with Gaozi about human nature's becoming virtuous as different from shaping a willow tree into bowls seems to contravene Behuniak's idea here. Mencius recommends not uniqueness, but development that corresponds with virtuous example. The source of value refers back to human predispositions to the social, and to family development, requiring development of the sprouts of particular virtues. That being the case, we may ask why these particular virtues are to be valued. Herein lies potential for circularity.

The criticism of circularity in the *Mencius* was introduced in *Zhuangzi's* 莊子 pointed remark that the fact that all humans have the capacities of *xin* prevents *xin* from being a standard by which to dictate the best results of cultivation, and his criticism is one which modern accounts of the *Mencius* would do well to respond to. Saying we should cultivate certain of our tendencies and reject others, especially desire, should lead one to ask on the basis of what standard we are to choose between them. Simply saying that choosing to cultivate the capacity of *xin* because it can lead us to live the best life seems to be problematic, since the justification for the value of *xin* lies in its supposed fundamentality. While Behuniak may seem to avoid this criticism by denying that any characteristics are essential, he still relies on the standard of *xin* to judge some uniqueness more praiseworthy than others.

Moreover, when Behuniak addresses the problematic circularity of the Mencian project, he does so in terms of how one could use already-existing feeling to further cultivate feeling (40). That he should ascribe potential circularity only to this aspect of the project betrays a blindness on his part, since the problem of circularity lies not in the possibility of cultivation but in the evaluation of it. He seems at times to suggest that all tendencies of feeling which already exist merit extension, but the *Mencius* does not equally praise all unique results of cultivation. Absent a description more thorough

than Behuniak provides of the difference between desire and feeling, it is unclear why some impulses are praiseworthy and others not. Lacking this, mere praise of those traits cultivated in the family cannot explain the difference. The idea that one can judge one's feeling on the basis of a self-examination that includes a close consideration of the effect of one's behavior on other people's material and emotional well-being is an interesting one; that this sort of empathy might be the core of Mencius' philosophy leads one to desire a more detailed description of the workings of this empathy, but one Behuniak does not provide.

In the end, Behuniak does not convincingly argue that biology makes no essential contribution to human disposition, since it seems impossible to provide a description of individual development entirely without reference to common human disposition, and though he escapes a biologically essentialist account, it seems that this account's reliance on family cultivation is essentialism of another sort. His greatest success lies in defending the contributions of the cultural and social to Mencian self-cultivation. He succeeds also in describing how moral sense in the *Mencius* is at bottom a social sense, but this fact, even combined with the assumptions of *qi* cosmology, does not seem enough to justify reading into the *Mencius* praise of the singular and uncommon in development of character.

Chinese Aesthetics: The Ordering of Literature, the Arts, and the Universe in the Six Dynasties. Edited by Zong-qi Cai. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004. Pp. vii + 359.

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蔡宗齊教授編的 *Chinese Aesthetics: The Ordering of Literature, the Arts, and the Universe in the Six Dynasties* 一書，是由二〇〇〇年在伊利諾州大學香檳校區所舉辦的「六朝美學國際研討會」的論文集結而成，其中包含了蔡宗齊教授撰寫的〈導言〉以及十篇專論，並且分屬三個部分：一是「意象與再現：繪畫、書法與園林的構建」，包含有 Robert E. Harrist Jr. 教授討論六朝書法領域中的「複製」現象及其引生的問題；Susan Bush 教授分析王微〈敘畫〉一文的論述脈絡；Victor H. Mair 教授比對謝赫「六法」與印度畫論「六支」之間的關係；林順夫教授探討六朝園林與烏托邦思想的相關性。二是「文字與形型：詩歌與散文」，其中有孫康宜教授闡釋陶潛個人形象的解讀與建構所牽涉到的詮釋的未定性問題、Rania Huntington 教授探討遊仙想像與審美創造的分際、François Martin 教授藉由一組鮮為人知的詩作，討論宗教實踐與貴遊文學的結合方式。三是「六朝美學的變數：論述的模

式」，包括了 Wai-yee Li 教授關於《世說新語》一書的考察，揭示其中所反映的審美的自我意識的興起；Ronald Egan 教授試圖從書法、音樂與繪畫的論述材料中，追索自然的要素在這些審美場域中所可能體現的性質與作用；蔡宗齊教授則從文學與繪畫的論述脈絡中，探論「神」這個概念的起源及其富涵的審美旨趣。

六朝美學及其相關的研究，可以說是近二十五年來中國古典文學研究領域中一項極為重要、而且頗有成果累積的議題。從較早「人的自覺」與「文學的自覺」等標記性或宣示性色彩濃厚的論題開始，我們可以看到許多大小的論述試圖展示繁複不同的文學與藝術的相關問題，而且在中國大陸、臺灣與歐美地區各自也有在地學術傳統所構建衍生的問題意識與論述脈絡。蔡宗齊教授編輯的《六朝美學》一書的出版，則標示了晚近歐美地區，尤其是美國的漢學界，在此一研究領域與相關議題上，所呈現的細緻而具體的研究成果，值得借鏡。透過上述論文標題的指示，我們或可覺察到這些論文在研究議題的取徑以及論述的開展與鋪陳上，大多有跨界互滲的現象，不論是從繪畫到書法到文學，或從印度到中國，或從宗教實踐到審美想像，也就是研究視角不再限定於單一文類或單一人文活動場域。凡此種種，或許反映了近十年來文學與美學研究的主要趨勢及其成果。我想就中提出幾篇論文加以討論。

異文化的交會

首先是 Victor H. Mair 教授探討謝赫提出的「六法」與印度畫論「六支」的關係。在“Xie He's 'Six Laws' of Painting and Their Indian Parallels”（頁81-122）這篇論文中，最具啟發性的論點有二：一是透過印度佛經中所常見之「事數」的論述方式，如「四諦」、「五陰」、「七覺」與「十二因緣」等提法，重新解讀謝赫「六法」的語法關係與語意內容，認定張彥遠的改編與讀法雖然順應了中國式的理解方式而有深遠的影響，卻也引生了重大的誤讀。根據 Mair 教授的說法，所謂的「氣韻生動」等「六法」的傳統斷句方式應該還原成「一曰：氣韻，生動是也。」據 Mair 教授考察，最早對張彥遠的讀法提出質疑、並且加以改正的論著，可能是 William Reynolds Beal Acker 教授於一九五四年編譯出版的《唐代與唐代以前的中國畫論》，但是這種解讀並沒有引起多大的注意，有的話也只是反駁的意見。至於中國的論述系統中，錢鍾書在一九七九年出版的《管錐篇》第四冊中，也有類似的讀法，而且顯然並未受到 Acker 教授論點的影響。二是仔細比對謝赫「六法」與印度畫論「六支」的具體內容，進而試圖闡明後者對前者所可能產生的影響方式

與途徑，並且質疑歷來有關「六法」與印度畫論兩無關係的說法。Mair 教授的解讀非常細膩深入，不但充分運用梵文相關的研究資料，有效說明了古印度畫論的發展脈絡，而且能從《世說新語》與《說文解字》等相關文獻資料中找到論據，藉以闡明中國式的理解方式對於佛典中「名數」與「法數」此等論述模式，在解讀上曾經引生的問題。Mair 教授的考察足以讓我們重新面對東漢以迄六朝這個階段中，當佛教進入中國以後，在文化圖像與論述場域中所可能引發的辨識與認同的具體形貌。更重要的是，我們或許需要重新建構「氣韻生動」或「氣韻，生動是也」的讀法所各自對應的批評史與美學史上的相關問題，並且提出可能的論題與論述取向。

誠如Mair 教授所指出的，佛教進入中國之後，對於中國文化的影響不只是佛經的譯介，也有更多觀念與技術層面上具體而細微的互動，因而這種影響可能是遍及生活中的各個面向。於此，François Martin 教授的論文(“Literary Games and Religious Practice at the End of the Six Dynasties: The Baguanzhai Poems by Xiao Gang and His Followers”)即是一個有趣的例子(頁222-235)。Martin 教授注意到一組很少被提及的詩作，即蕭綱及其文學侍從庾肩吾等人所作的〈八關齋夜賦四城門四首〉。在這組作品中，「八關齋」與「四城門」都與佛教有關，尤其是「四城門」分詠老、病、死與沙門四個主題，雖然直接借用佛陀年少時在四個城門的經歷的典故，但也普遍反映了生活的實在或歷程與宗教悟道的依存關係，因此，就在舉行宗教儀式的夜晚，蕭綱等人即席以詩相互吟唱，而吟詠的內容與形式，可能是當時流行東宮的宮體詩體式。在此，感官的生活形式如何能與宗教的靈修活動相互結合？這就是 Martin 教授論文的重點。透過具體詩例的解讀，我們可以看到梁朝的宮廷作家正經歷一場饒富興味，有關莊嚴與戲謔的競逐，並努力證明或顯耀佛教的要義。信仰，總不是那麼理所當然的選擇，也不是全無掙扎與苦楚。如果我們想要闡明生活場域中審美活動與道德實踐之間的複雜性，則 Martin 教授的解讀方式或許可以提供一個可能的取徑，那就是對於文本進行細讀的工作。六朝文人生活的多面向，尤其是在印度佛教的世界觀與價值信念介入中國文人的生活世界之後，呈現出怎樣具體的問題與回應，仍有待我們進一步闡發。譬如沈約，當我們的注意力僅停留在他對新詩體的影響時，又如何能解釋他在篤信道教的家世背景中寫出〈懺悔文〉或〈捨身願疏〉這類作品所可能揭露的信息？

六朝文人的生活世界

其次是 Wai-ye Li 教授關於《世說新語》一書的考察，“*Shishuo xinyu and the Emergence of Aesthetic Self-Consciousness in the Chinese Tradition*”（頁227-276）。在這篇論文中，Li 教授認為《世說新語》一書的編纂，標示了中國古典傳統中審美的自我意識的開端，展示出一個豐富而多樣的有關人的感官、知覺與行動的生活世界；其中，對於人在形體與道德、言辭與知性上所顯現的各種具體的風貌，提出細微且敏銳的觀察與判斷，而身體的論述也就因此有著更為細膩深刻的理論基礎與義涵：表象即是意義所在，知覺便是一種行動。最重要的，《世說新語》所呈現的關於人在感官、知覺與行動各個面向上所顯示的生活世界，儘管豐富與多樣，但在編纂的動機與意圖上，原來是有著政治與藝術或文化活動的對立性，而劉義慶個人傳記中「以世路艱難，不復跨馬」的舉動，便是一個具體的表徵，足以說明《世說新語》一書的性質與作用。根據 Li 教授的考察，這樣一種藝術與政治生活相互分立的宣示，或者關於真實自然的人物風姿的提示與憧憬，在在闡明了那種宣示與憧憬，僅只是對已然消逝的理想或樂園反映更深的焦慮與懷歸。

至於六朝文人生活與藝術想像的複雜性，也同樣可以在 Robert E. Harrist Jr. 教授關於六朝書法史上「複製」之行為與現象的論文中找到例證。藉由一段有關王羲之的手札被偽造而讓自己遭受不辨真偽的愚弄的逸事說起，Harrist 教授除了闡明複製行為所揭示的物質性社會脈絡之外，更深入探討在書法場域中臨摹與倣寫等活動，所可能隱含的造就藝術知覺與審美意識的效用。然而，在古典文學或美學的研究領域中，既有的研究取向比較注重文學或美學場域中內在想像與思維法則的分析，多少也就忽略了創作活動所必然照應的物質社會基礎，因此 Harrist 教授的取徑或可提示我們可以開展的研究面向。正如在本書中，我們看到林順夫教授將六朝林園的空間想像直接連結到烏托邦的思想，但也可以像 Craig Clunas 教授在 *Fruitful Sites* (1996) 一書的處理方式，從物質經濟的層面分析古典文化中林園空間所以構造成形的具體脈絡。簡單說來，生活世界中所呈現的各種面向理應是彼此相互滲透穿梭，藝術與生活的分立可能只是一種想像。

六朝美學的遺贈

六朝這個階段，不但在音樂、繪畫、書法與詩文各個領域都留下許多可觀的論述材料與論點，即使文人本身也都標記著許多值得記憶的事蹟或典型，啓引並凝塑後代文人學者各類具體的文化想像：不論是《世說新語》一書中所記錄的人

與事，自然、園林與遊仙等思想的游移跨界，或者是陶潛個人多層的形象，我們都可以在往後的文化論述場域中找到相關的解與覆的增補。同時，透過歷史的回溯，我們可以在六朝這個階段看到古典文化傳統從漢代集體意識分衍出個人意識——借用余英時先生考察所得的結論——之後，關於不同類型人文活動的種種論述，進而探詢原來在孤立狀態下、或在子、主題範圍內可以得到解釋的某些人文活動彼此所可能具有的關聯。因此，藝術與生活、想像與真實、審美與倫理或宗教實踐，彼此既可以獨立形成具有差異的對立關係，又可以相互滲透並揭示一個完整的關係系統，《六朝美學》一書中各篇論文所具體呈現的跨界研究方式及其成果，就清楚提醒我們關於六朝文學與藝術的研究，必須觸及到不同的實踐領域之間的對應原則。

前文提過，六朝這個階段標示了古典文化傳統中關於文學自覺意識的開端，不但文學此一概念從廣義的學術的指涉義涵中分立出來，自成一個獨立而自足的書寫場域，同時也因著這種分立的結果而展開一系列有關審美活動特質的探索。然而，問題就在於，我們當下所指稱的審美活動及其相關的研究課題，是否能夠完全對應古典傳統所植根的文化脈絡？於此，蔡宗齊教授在他的〈導言〉的最後部分提出了一個有趣的觀察。依照《文心雕龍》一書的用法，「文」的概念除了指涉文學與文章這類與我們當下的語用脈絡相接近的觀念之外，其實也包含有宇宙的秩序等更為繁複的語義內涵，因此，蔡教授把「文」的概念解釋成支配各種人文活動與表現的「組織性原則」（頁22），並且強調因應這種語用與思維的特定模式，可以展開一套不同於西方十八世紀以降的美學的論述角度。無獨有偶，在 Michael Fuller 教授最近發表的一篇論文中，“The Aesthetic as Immanent Assent to Pattern within Heterogeneity, or 文”（見鄭毓瑜教授編《中國文學研究的新趨向：自然、審美與比較研究》，2005），也提出類似的考察。Fuller 教授一方面從康德在《判斷力批判》中關於「審美判斷」的解說入手，另一方面則探索「文」字在原初所指涉的語意脈絡與內容，藉此比對這兩種提法對於審美經驗所可能引生的解釋模式，並且指出康德的論點，亦即審美判斷並不在於給予直接的知識，而是在於反映人對經驗的理解能力的特殊限制，可以與中國古典傳統展示的觀點相互接合。Fuller 教授強調「文」因此指向一種顯現的形式構造與安排，是我們給予事物之所以成理的判斷。就此而言，「文」的概念，不論是如蔡教授所提出的是「組織性原則」，或是如 Fuller 教授所揭示的「彷彿於物之理」，應該成為當下重新探討六朝美學遺贈中一項根本的議題，而且必然觸及到不同的實踐領域之間的對應原

則與對照關係。

蔡宗齊教授是當前美國漢學界中具有代表性的中壯輩學者之一，不但個人在詩學領域顯現深廣的學術素養與研究成果，更重要的是他的努力以及能夠評斷並接納的眼界，促成這本研討會論文集的出版，進而提供我們晚近在六朝美學研究領域的新視野及其可能的發展方向。任何學術社群的成果累積，除了依靠個人的創建之外，或許更需要造就論述的空間，藉以提供社群成員之間的相互對話、並凝聚可能的成果。

《明末雲間三子研究》，姚蓉著，廣州：廣東高等教育出版社，二〇〇四年。4 + 三八〇頁。

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自陳寅恪《柳如是別傳》、朱東潤《陳子龍及其時代》之後，學界對於明末忠義詩人陳子龍(1608-1647)的研究，已累積了不少成果。以專書而論，最受矚目者自推孫康宜《陳子龍柳如是詩詞情緣》，此外尚有蔡勝德《陳子龍詩學研究》(1981)、涂茂齡《陳大樽詞的研究》(1992)、王坤地《陳子龍及其經世思想研究》(1993)、蘇菁媛《陳子龍詞學理論及其詞的研究》(2004)等多篇學位論文。這些著作各從不同的角度論析了陳子龍的思想、文學以及人格。但與陳子龍並稱「雲間三子」的李雯(1607-1647)、宋徵輿(1618-1667)二人，歷來卻罕受學者青睞，相關的研究幾乎付諸闕如。此中原因，固然是李雯、宋徵輿的文學成就均不及陳子龍，另一方面恐怕也導因於李、宋二子變節仕清的經歷，減低了學者們的研究興趣。在如此的學術背景下，《明末雲間三子研究》的成書可謂極具開拓意義，正如作者姚蓉對於自己著作的評價，此書的創新處首先表現在：「探討了李雯、宋徵輿的生平思想與文學創作，填補了這方面的研究空白。」(〈前言〉，頁10)

除了研究對象的拓展之外，此書的寫作與前人從詩學、詞學或者經世思想等單一層面討論陳子龍的方式亦不相同，作者意在綜攝各項相關議題，以較為開闊的視野對雲間三子的生平與文學作一全面性的觀照。先就上篇〈雲間三子生平思想研究〉而論，此篇分爲〈晚明江南士風與文風概述〉、〈雲間三子的家世淵源與前期活動〉、〈雲間三子的經世情懷與中期活動〉、〈雲間三子的後期活動與生死抉擇〉四章，論述策略乃由時代背景與地理環境入手，而後將雲間三子的生平劃

分爲三個階段，並掌握住三子在人生不同階段的活動重心來加以論析。文章的討論過程中，作者參考了豐富的文獻資料，並以嚴謹的態度進行推證，使得雲間三子的家世、愛情、社團活動、政治思想、生死抉擇、人格精神，得以脈絡分明地呈現紙上。特別是第四章，作者拈出宋徵輿對大學土方岳貢的抨擊，用以證成宋徵輿的政治立場本與陳子龍、李雯有所分歧，材料的運用相當細膩；此章在對照陳子龍之殉節與李雯、宋徵輿之仕清時，對於國變後雲間三子的心路歷程以及當時士大夫的易代心態也都有深入的剖析，於上篇中尤見精彩。

下篇〈雲間三子文學研究〉則包含全書的第五章至第八章，討論的課題分別是：〈雲間三子的文學思想〉、〈雲間三子的詞〉、〈雲間三子的詩〉、〈雲間三子對清代文學的影響〉。以研究深度而言，此篇的重點應在於探討雲間三子文學作品的六、七兩章；此二章中，作者每能以雲間三子的生平思想爲依據，具體分析三子詩詞的內容意旨與風格特色。例如書中指出，陳子龍詞較多傷春之作，表現出「繁華落盡的淒涼」、「世易時移的滄桑感」（頁226），李雯詞則較多悲秋之作，此乃因「李雯在明朝一直科場失意，心中不免有貧士之感」（頁228）；詩作方面，作者認爲陳子龍詩擅用豔麗的暖色調字詞來表達內心的悲憤，因而「形成了淒豔的詩風」（頁285），宋徵輿詩喜用清淡的冷色調字詞來表現安寧的心境，則「形成一種清淡閑雅的風格」（頁288）。這些論斷均能有效地捕捉雲間三子詩詞作品的某些特質，值得重視。相形之下，此篇第五章以「復古論」、「怨刺說」、「創作論」三項要點來分析陳子龍等人的文學思想，較少獨特見解，也尚未建構出雲間派的詩論體系。至於第八章論雲間三子與清代文學的關係，用意已在於收束全文。

若將全書上、下篇作一比較，此書上篇專論雲間三子的生平經歷，論點集中，較能給人一氣呵成之感；下篇則在有限的篇幅中，探究了雲間三子的文學思想、詞作、詩作以及對清代文學的影響，論題稍多，力量不免分散，而此點實因全書的體例所限。整體觀之，此書作爲第一部研究雲間三子的專著，不僅關注的層面寬廣，所提出的論點大抵亦有本有據，頗能展現作者實事求是的學術精神，堪稱一部力作。

此書涉及的議題較多，自然也有若干細部的推論還可再加以斟酌。例如作者在評介陳子龍的生平時述及：「子龍對復古文學創作的熱情，直到崇禎十年(1637)他中進士之後，把主要精力投入實現其『用世之志』，才逐漸減退。」（頁50）此一說法對「復古文學」範圍的界定似嫌狹隘。事實上，「雲間三子」的名號因《雲間三子新詩合稿》而確定，此部詩歌合集可視爲雲間三子實踐復古信念

的代表作，其寫作時間乃在崇禎十三年(1640)至十七年(1644)之間；同時，崇禎十三年至十六年(1643)，雲間三子亦曾合編《皇明詩選》，此集推尊前、後七子的詩作為明詩之「正經」，更表現出雲間三子繼承復古事業的強烈決心。據此，陳子龍後來減退復古文學創作熱情的說法，恐難成立。在陳子龍的觀念中，「復古文學」與「用世之志」其實並無衝突，二者反而應合為一體，如〈皇明詩選序〉所云：「二三子生於萬曆之季，而慨然志在刪述，追游、夏之業，約於正經，以維心術。豈曰能之？國家景運之隆，啓迪其意智耳。」¹ 詩歌之雅正既能維繫心術，並與國家之景運息息相關，則雲間諸子對於復古文學的追求，不正是用世之志的一種展現？另外，再如此書第六章曾賞析陳子龍與宋徵輿〈玉蝴蝶·美人〉的同題之作，作者云：「相形之下，宋徵輿詞雖然對女子的相思著墨更多，其中的相思之苦表達得也很深沈，然而卻流於普通，不及陳子龍詞神形俱備，形象豐滿。」(頁197)此一評論先讚美宋徵輿詞中的相思之情「表達得也很深沈」，之後又云「流於普通」，前後語意不相連貫，讀者實無法由此體會出宋徵輿詞作不如陳子龍的理由。陳子龍詩詞的整體造詣高於李雯、宋徵輿，此為文學史上的定論，自無疑義。但就單一作品而言，陳子龍之作卻未必篇篇優於李、宋二子，以此闕同題詞作而論，二者的高下即不明顯。作者在論析雲間三子的個別篇章時，或許不必過度拘守「有明以來，詞家斷推湘真第一」(譚獻《復堂日記》)、宋徵輿詩文「精鍊不及子龍」(《四庫全書總目》)的既定觀念。

Snakes' Legs: Sequels, Continuations, Rewritings, and Chinese Fiction. Edited by Martin W. Huang. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004. Pp. vii + 306.

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黃衛總(Martin W. Huang)以李漁對續書的說法「狗尾續貂」為書名出發，指出李漁見到了續書的第一次繁榮，並比較了劉廷璣認為續書不可能超越原小說的看法，黃衛總以《中國通俗小說總目提要》中的小說有百分之十三為續書，截至本書編纂為止，只有李忠昌的《古代小說續書漫話》針對這個現象做研究。因此，他認為續書研究有其重要性。其原因有三：一、不研究續書，對中國小說的理解就不完整。二、不能因為假定續書是一種模仿就將它排除在研究之外，因為

¹ 上海文獻叢書編輯委員會：《皇明詩選》(上海：華東師範大學出版社，1991年)，頁5。

文本的借用 (textual borrowing) 幾乎是中國白話小說的主要特色，續書只是在次等的層級上強調了這一點。三、研究中國小說創作過程中，續書是作者和讀者間複雜關係的肥沃土壤，因為續書作者經常意識到身為讀者和作者的雙重身分。

此書探討的續書範圍始於明末而終於清朝 (1644-1911)。主要問題有二：一、既然續書是一種「聲譽不佳」的文類 (genre)，為何續書作者依然持續寫作？二、續書讀者為什麼願意讀續書，即使他們明知拿續書和原作相比會失望？

接續以上兩個面向的討論，黃衛總處理了續書的定義。他首先引用林辰的看法，認為廣義的續書可以是為了使原作更好而延伸、摘要、重寫原作；狹義指引申、演繹原作的角色和情節發展。而李忠昌則認為續書發展了原作的敘事邏輯，亦即：續書必須和原作在結構上有所聯繫，在主題上一般來說能與原作的情節有聯結，如首尾相銜，因果相應等。此外，Paul Budra 和 Betty A. Schellenberg 則認為續書是故事的年序延伸 (chronological extension of a narrative)，它本身是封閉和完整的。Gerard Génette 也強調續書的封閉性 (closure)，書的「繼續」 (continuation) 是「完成」 (completion)，而續書則是「延長」 (prolongation)。

透過以上多種定義及不同見解，黃衛總以比較寬泛的角度界定續書：「接續的故事」 (ensuing narratives)。因此，這部選集收錄了不同層次的續書研究：第一部分是經典續書，第二部分則為一般不認為是續書，但可放入林辰所定義的廣義續書，使我們重思續書的本質的小說；第三部分則是晚清續書，由於西風東漸，這類續書也在「新編」、「擬舊」等技巧上改變了續書的風貌。全書選錄十篇文章，簡介如下：

第一章論及續書的概念在中國比西方更廣，接下來談十七世紀中期續書的興起和同時出現關於續書的論述；而另一個續書的重要時刻乃在一七九一年《紅樓夢》出版之後，許多《紅樓夢》續書都有所謂的「續書焦慮」 (xushu anxiety)，其焦慮是兩方面的，其一為對於其他《紅樓夢》續書有高度的讀者自覺，其二則是要和續書「畫蛇添足」的印象抵抗，努力做出回應或突破。

第二章由 Li Qiancheng 探討《西遊記》的三本續書：《續西遊記》、《後西遊記》與《西遊補》。作者指出，如果《西遊記》是心的旅程，那麼這三本續書都繼續且重覆了這個旅程，它們也都經歷了「往內在轉變」的過程，更著重於人心的內在運作，而在《西遊補》達到「最內在的終點」 (innermost destination)，這個內在旅程和晚明心學主宰知識分子的視野有關。

第三章則由胡曉真探討《續金瓶梅》一書。著重指出丁耀亢認為自己在「正

確地」解讀《金瓶梅》，要傳遞的是過度縱欲使明滅亡，並且在放入對明朝的懷舊及忠誠的同時，也承認歷史循環的無可避免，利用因果報應來合理化朝代的變遷。此外，丁氏也認為他的成書是對《太上感應篇》最正確的詮釋。

接下來的第四章由馬克夢 (Keith McMahon) 從三個領域談《紅樓夢》續書。第一、續書如何使寶玉「更好」，如：更健康、更符合社會對貴族男性的期待；第二、為黛玉辯護；第三、提供寶黛之間愛情的解決之道。這些續書都將原作的複雜性簡單化，但是續書解決原作難以處理之部分的具原創性的企圖，和續書堅持將女性放在一夫多妻制上來看，或以直接和實用的解決辦法來解決獨立於成人指導之外的年輕愛情，都是值得注意的。

在第五章中，Ellen Widmer 從《紅樓夢》續書談到女性讀者與中國傳統小說的關係，續書把目標放在數量更多、但是接受較少教育的女性讀者身上。如：《紅樓夢影》就證明了《紅樓夢》有廣大女性讀者，作者更斷言最早由女性創作的古典小說就是《紅樓夢影》，其原因在於寫作續書比起自己原創一部小說，可使女性寫作這件事不致於顯得太放肆，《紅樓夢》在閱讀和寫作的領域上對女性都是適當的 (appropriate)。Widmer 還把《紅樓夢》續書和當時的彈詞連起來看，以對女性在十九世紀直接參與中國通俗小說的發展獲得更完整的圖象。

至第六章，Yang Shuhui 論述《水滸傳》的續書，指出其數量僅次於《紅樓夢》。俞萬春寫作《蕩寇志》試圖說明這些反抗者最後如何被處死，此書實際上接續的是金聖嘆的七十回《水滸》。《水滸傳》成功地揭示了政府的腐敗和無能，因此對俞氏來說，梁山泊的好漢被官兵降服並處死便成爲一個很難處理的部分；俞氏遂設計了陳希真這類人物，因爲政府的腐敗而武裝起來，結果陳希真還是成爲了類似梁山泊好漢的角色，而這樣的角色是俞氏一開始便想要駁斥的。因此，儘管俞萬春宣布要拋棄原作的意識形態卻又不免陷於原作的邏輯之中。Yang Shuhui 最後評論：俞萬春《蕩寇志》想要重寫全部的《水滸傳》，並試圖呈現一個人在被處決時，如何能夠不反叛，但是卻失敗了。

第七章由何谷理 (Robert Hegel) 談論跨文本的關係 (transtextual relationships)。《說唐全傳》重寫了它的「祖先」(例如《隋唐演義》) 的一些重要角色，藉由轉變這些相對「寫實」的人物，使之成爲遠非生命舞臺類型，兼具可笑和娛樂性的角色 (159 頁)，來諧擬具崇高文學價值的小說。《說唐》在《隋唐演義》中創造了一種另類的歷史閱讀，它本身就引起了很多續書，如《說唐後傳》。Hegel 認爲《說唐全傳》是由文學作家創作的作品，而不是由說書人稿本集合而成的作品。

第八章談到清朝《如意君傳》的作者陳天池常常要他的讀者心中有明朝的《如意君傳》。Laura Wu 認為陳天池從道德批判的角度進行書寫，正確地重寫了明朝《如意君傳》。明朝本的《如意君傳》以女性為主角，陳天池的故事則是「男性重新獲得權力，父權重新恢復」(199-200 頁)。何谷理和 Wu 認為《說唐全傳》和《如意君傳》是續書，因為它們都是以續書的形式對原作做批判的閱讀。它們可以被視為重寫，必須要讀者喚起對原作的回憶。在此，讀者的訓練變成一個很重要的因素。《說唐全傳》之前的《隋唐演義》本身大部分就是根據《隋煬帝豔史》和袁于令的《隋史逸聞》而來，因此它是「原創」加「續書」。《隋煬帝豔史》本身又是《隋史逸聞》的來源，而《隋煬帝豔史》則是由《混唐後傳》而來，《混唐後傳》之名又顯示它可能是某書之續書，因此《隋唐演義》基本上是三部小說的重寫。從《混唐後傳》到《說唐全傳》就是一個「續書」的過程，重寫 (rewrite) 和續集 (sequel) 兩者常常在這過程中無法分辨。由此可見，中國小說有一個傾向，就是在「續集」出現之前，常常就已有「重寫」的現象了。也就是說，一開始續書是以重寫的形式出現，在重寫之後又接著有了續集，「重寫」和「續集」這兩種續書的形式常常不易分辨清楚。

第九章論及晚清續書的兩種重要形式：「擬舊小說」和「翻新小說」。藉由「時代錯誤」、「錯置」和「滑稽模仿」等手法，寫作者表達他們對快速轉變的當代社會的想法。Ying Wang 在第九章討論的兩本《新鏡花緣》都可稱為「翻新小說」。蕭然鬱生的版本是希望透過《新鏡花緣》中的改革運動，發洩他的失望。《新鏡花緣》延續了《鏡花緣》以旅程為主題 (motif)，同時也是譴責小說。而陳嘯廬的《新鏡花緣》和華琴珊的《續鏡花緣》則堪稱是已在《鏡花緣》中出現之女性議題的晚清「再度發聲」(revoice)。陳主張「適度的女性觀點」(moderate feminist views)，而華則為成長中的女性運動感到驚駭。Wang 認為這樣的分歧是因為原作的的不確定性和原作冀求重讀 (rereading) 和重寫的自我意識傾向。

第十章探討的是劉鶚對他自己的《老殘遊記》所做的續書。續書一般都是「由他人寫的」(allographic)，但這一本則是「作者自撰的」(autographic)。在晚清之前，唯一由作者自己撰寫的續書是方汝浩的《禪真後史》，亦即《禪真逸史》的續書。作者自著的續書在進入二十世紀後已經很普遍，續書的「自傳體傾向」(autobiographical tendency) 係以從「自我辨證」(self-vindication) 到「自我慶祝」(self-celebration) 的歷程來呈現。續書強迫讀者從一個新的、更為自傳的角度去重讀原作。劉鶚的續書是經過單一作者 (single author) 認可和合法化的續書，它使得

原作比其他的續書原作更具自傳性質。

進入民國之後，盜版書盛行，如：張恨水的《啼笑姻緣》出版後就有十幾種非經授權的續書出現，甚至有人冒張恨水之名寫小說。這是張恨水爲什麼自己寫續書的一個原因，就是要證明他自己才是唯一合法能寫真正續書的作者。有人認爲張恨水在續書中把許多角色寫死，是爲了要杜絕續書的產生。在此，寫續書成爲證明作者爲原作之擁有者的方法。二十世紀前半，續書的寫作僅限於舊派小說家，如張恨水。五四作家不寫續書，如巴金在寫續集時，他不用續書這一名稱，而用「三部曲」的名稱，強調所有的創作都是原創，而不是利用原作的成功來獲取利益，寫續書已經變成舊派小說家爲了錢出賣靈魂之事，五四作家不願被定義成這類作家。續書的寫作到今天仍在持續，但是它們被認爲是「科學地」重構原作遺失的部分，所以說文學詮釋現在很明顯地呈現爲續書，文學詮釋和續書已經無法判然分辨了。

大體而言，本書所集論文堪稱一時之選，不論研究者之視野、問題意識、文化闡釋以及對小說傳統、文本流變、影響的考掘，往往深具啓發性。相對於近日續書的研究成果逐漸豐碩，如：王旭川著《中國小說續書研究》¹、趙建忠著《紅樓夢續書研究》²等書，這類專著或是以類型，或是以方法論，或是以價值評量看待續書現象與小說史、小說傳統的關係，比較習慣將小說續書置於「先鋒」、「高峰」或是「完整性」的歷史之鏈中予以闡析。與之相較，這本選集的呈現毋寧是傾向貼近續書創作情境中那斷片性的、拆解式的、邊緣的、也可能是游擊式的，總之，可能不那麼偉大的創作狀況，正因爲如此，似乎也更吻合續書的歷史存在。

但是我們在這些歷史斷片當中仍能透視若干群體效應或者是更爲游離的現象：由於此書各章的研究對續書定義的關懷各異，因此針對問題的提出與開展有時就顯得比較側重在某些特定面向，相對的忽視各續書不同創作狀態下的個別特色。如第二章：Li Qiancheng 探討《西遊記》的三本續書均以哲學和文學之心之「內在變化」(inward turn) 進行集體論述。然而我們卻在《後西遊記》的裝僧與扮儒的書寫策略中發現這部續書透過一連串的漫畫畫卷與語言機鋒，來對「西遊」系列中唐僧故事與《西遊記》原著正典化的另一種消費與消解，所謂「(天花)才子」意見，顯示出與其他續書對「心」或「內化」問題的關注有相當距離，反倒

¹ 上海：學林出版社，二〇〇四年五月一版。

² 天津：天津古籍出版社，一九九七年九月一版。

是對僧團、儒林之集體現象的嘲諷與批判等「外部」問題的提出特別引人注意。

又如第六章中，Yang Shuhui 討論俞萬春《蕩寇志》的續書策略，看來仍以金批《水滸》「從作家出發」的觀點切入，而不是「從文本出發」的深刻回應，因此所謂「《水滸》邏輯」仍是「金聖嘆邏輯」。其實《蕩寇志》選擇《水滸傳》「三打祝家莊」作為「復仇」意志之展現，正是在「灰色地帶」尋找轉化的契機，「家族」成為「國族」與「民族」結合的精神紐帶。對「莊園」模式的再利用，一方面回歸宋江「權力」來源的「《水滸》邏輯」的記憶，以質疑其領導地位；一方面再次發動民間新興的莊園力量作為整編的自發性想像，以取代陳麗卿遭調戲式的原「《水滸》邏輯」的「官逼民反」，使得「蕩寇」之舉具有「家族」意涵，「家族化」話語控制與演出實際上比「國族想像」更具體可見。不只《水滸》續書有這個現象，「家國互喻」這類書寫遍及《紅樓》續書、《金瓶梅》續書以及《說唐》系列和家將類小說等各類小說及其續書。因此，本書各篇文章實際牽涉續書文化所牽動的明清中國有關國／社群／家／自我等層級的整合與回應，如果能予以分疏，說不定又是另一番文化景觀。

以上兩點觀察，前者的問題在於將《西遊記》續書視為「猴的內在變化」的一個整體，以致忽略《後西遊記》似乎並不是「內化」的問題，反而比較接近譴責、黑幕小說的「揭露」美學，是對「外部」社會的關注多於「內化」的省視；而後者在論述「《水滸》邏輯」的成敗時，對《水滸》續書的考察傾向於針對俞萬春《蕩寇志》的單一續書之上，以致於對明清士人在「《水滸》邏輯」的意識形態接受史的理解反而未能脫離「金聖嘆神話」。當然，作為不同研究者心血所匯聚的總集，採取單點或脈絡化面向的測繪和闡釋是比較難以統一的，基本上這部選集的論文都是徵引宏富，選題、立論多有創新之處，取得集大成式的成果。

這篇評介與其說是評論，不如名之為濃縮的譯介，對我而言，在歷經一大段踽踽獨行的續書研究生涯，欣見一群志同道合的學友，限於篇幅，與身為讀者的蔽障，如此的回應是明顯不足與不敬的，事實上，此書每一篇文章幾乎都在相關領域裏帶來突破的效力與創發，不僅值得一讀，更牽引出許多「描跡元素」(tracer element)，以待來者循著續書研究的蹤跡繼續探索。

Revolution Plus Love: Literary History, Women's Bodies, and Thematic Repetition in Twentieth-Century Chinese Fiction. By Liu Jianmei. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003. Pp. 272.

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近二十年來，中國現代文學研究的地貌急遽變動，發掘「被壓抑的現代性」蔚成風氣，大量不見經傳的作家和文學流派浮出地表，久享盛譽的革命作家也被重新包裝，正典被傾覆，範式被重寫，局面之紛繁令人眼花繚亂。最近見世的劉建梅的《革命加戀愛》一書是一部不可多得的力作，在性別與中國現代文學研究方面是繼周蕾的《女性與中國現代性》(1991) 之後最重要的收穫之一。對這一重要的小說類型還沒作過如此系統、深入的探討，而觀點新穎、研究紮實，更是其長處，且在宏觀與微觀、理論與文本的結合處理方面，對於「重寫文學史」具有方法上的啓示性。

「革命加戀愛」是一種小說類型，淵源於清末嚴復、梁啟超等人提倡的「新小說」運動，其名稱則出現在一九二七年「大革命」前後，「左翼」作家蔣光慈、茅盾、丁玲等人紛紛創作反映時代氣息的革命羅曼史，頗受年輕讀者歡迎，一時間競起效之，其流風餘響不絕如縷，幾乎貫穿整個二十世紀。此書除〈引言〉、〈結論〉之外，分六章。第一章交代二十年代末這一小說突興的原因及其政治與文化背景。二至四章論述一九二六年至一九三五年間各種「革命加戀愛」小說，分別對革命男作家蔣光慈、茅盾、洪靈菲、華漢，女作家白薇、盧隱、丁玲及「海派」作家施蛰存、劉呐鷗、穆時英、張資平、葉靈鳳等五位作了分析。最後兩章論述五十年代至世紀末的演變，敘述方式由專論作家轉為專題討論，著重性別與政治的關係。

一九四九年之後大陸的文學史書寫，作為愛國主義教育的重要工具，以救亡啓蒙、感時憂國作為評價作品的標準，凡列為經典的，無不以歌頌革命與鬥爭為能事。在小說方面則把茅盾一九三四年的《子夜》視為「現實主義」「史詩」傳統的正宗，偶爾提及「革命加戀愛」小說，也嗤之以鼻，或語焉不詳。其實革命史詩式的長篇小說不僅脫胎於「革命加戀愛」類型，而且在後來的發展中也離不開愛欲的基因，由此說來正統文學史家遮蔽歷史，數典忘祖，莫此為甚。因此劉建梅的這一番歷史的重構，有正本清源之功。我們看到現代小說裏所表現的，套用張愛玲的話，不光有「壯烈」，還有「悲壯」和「蒼涼」的內容，而後兩者是更具

「人性」與「婦人性」的¹。這正是此書的獨特貢獻，即從女性批評的眼光，精細分析女性身體在「革命加戀愛」小說中的複雜表現，尤其在女性作家的筆下，女性身體指符與「革命」話語吊詭糾葛在一起，伴隨著深刻的創傷記憶，從中一再發出痛楚、異議之聲，正可見一部「小說中國」，欲歌還泣。

作者意識到，對於「革命加戀愛」小說的歷史重構涉及如何對待長期以來主宰文學史書寫的範式以及如何描述歷史記憶的問題。因此她在論述中一方面揭示「革命」書寫範式的錯謬，卻未將自己置身局外，反而時時警覺那種文學史書寫機制仍在觀念層面上運作的可能性，另一方面也提防過猶不及，避免把批評和研究導向簡單化或意識形態化。另外我覺得難能可貴的是劉建梅對現今北美學界的研究傾向的反思，她尖銳指出那種「現代性戀物」傾向，即理論先行，動輒講中國文學現代性，誇誇其談，其結果是忽視了歷史。

針對以往「整體性歷史」的文學史範式，作者有意作一種接近歷史真實的「多元歷史」的重構工作。伴隨著這樣的批評意識，《革命加戀愛》展開其複雜而厚實的歷史描述，即以革命與戀愛、性別與政治之間的互動關係為經緯，而牽涉到「集體神話與個人幸福、理想與現實、崇高與平凡、政治與美學、男性與女性」等諸多脈絡（頁210）。此書的各階段劃分以及把作家歸類的論述框架，必定帶來讀者的期待，而作者卻時時檢討自己的理論前設，並向成見挑戰。革命的意義隨時變遷，愛慾的元素變幻莫測，其間相激相成、相吸相斥，演出一幕幕兒女英雄、情場戰場、家國想像的熱戲。如書題中「主題重複」一詞所蘊涵的，在「革命加戀愛」小說的展開中，重複的語言「表演」如萬花筒般千姿百態。作者始終貫徹「差異」的原則，把文本放到歷史語境裏，結合作者傳記、社會思潮、政治理想與文學市場等，作具體的探討。即使在同一時期、同一集團中，也各具面目，而在豐富的多層次對照中，意義的連鎖轉圓無窮。

作者潛心於歷史之中，作為一種批評性策略的運用，在大量閱讀中發見並選擇那些久遭忘卻的文本或事件，如對洪靈菲、華漢等人的小說的詮釋便是顯例。本來我覺得起始於一九二八年的「革命文學」論爭的目標之一是反對傳統的「傷感主義」，要把它徹底根除，不消說郁達夫的「沉淪」風格被視作昨日黃花，部分地也是針對魯迅的。很難想像在洪靈菲的「革命加戀愛」小說中，傳統才子式的傷感表現卻變本加厲，而他居然也是「左聯」的一個重要成員。歷史的脈絡常常

¹ 參張愛玲：〈自己的文章〉，《流言》（臺北：皇冠文化出版公司，1968年），頁17-22。

牽一髮而動全身，不小心便會落入概念的陷阱；在反思「整體性歷史」觀的同時，也會不自覺地把問題看得簡單化，如一般把大陸一九四九年之後十七年間的文學看作鐵板一塊，認為文學已被徹底的意識形態化。針對這種看法，劉建梅對於蕭也牧的短篇小說〈我們夫婦之間〉的發見和分析很有意義，說明在革命的新環境裏，愛慾也有細膩深入的表現，「革命加戀愛」的小說類型在不斷的重複中，作家的「影響焦慮」並未完全消失。正如作者進一步揭示的，蕭氏隨即遭到了玲等人的批判，那些鮮為人知的事件說明「十七年」文學是怎樣一步步走向整合的。另外突出的一點是作者對於二手材料的掌握和處理方面，我想很少人能夠做到像她那樣廣徵博引，盡量尊重前人的研究成果，同時又能提出問題、堅持己見。這方面例子甚多，就不一一列舉了。

從一九二六年到一九三五年約十年間的論述占了三章篇幅，就全書所涵蓋的時間而言，顯見側重所在。此期間社會狀況與文學思潮比其他時期遠較複雜，因此這樣的安排是完全妥當的。各章論述似乎採用男女作家、革命與都市作家之間的「參差的對照」的寫法，對於「多元歷史」的展開來說，在結構上頗見巧思。對男作家的論述已在女性批評的視域之中，如蔣光慈、茅盾屬「普羅米修士」風格，洪靈菲、華漢屬「維特」風格，這一借自李歐梵的比喻在性別話語中，卻意味著在男性身上生物與文化的配方也有陰陽的色調差異。他們作品中對女性身體的不同「凝視」方式則反映了男性對獨立「新女性」的恐懼，也體現了知識分子的時代焦慮，不光是他們在理想與現實之間的人格分裂，也是革命與現代性危機的表徵。第三章論述白薇尤其精彩，在她的小說《炸彈與征鳥》中，從她的染上革命的「病體」，發出的歇斯底里的呼號，同盧隱和玲的偏向知性的小說話語相比，更見出一種獨特的女性感受。

這些地方對我來說，讀來尤覺新鮮。第四章把施蛰存等五位「海派」作家放到「革命加戀愛」的脈絡裏來討論，對於「新感覺派」的一般認識來說，具有某種挑戰性。無論是張資平從半路殺出的《長途》和《石榴花》，還是施蛰存的被忽視的處女作〈追〉，都能說明「革命加戀愛」小說在當時的影響力。在劉吶鷗和穆時英的作品裏，「革命」被推到後臺，身分曖昧，而他們對女性身體的想像融入都市生活和現代主義美學，富於頹廢氣息，對於革命具顛覆性。在如此廣闊而絢麗多彩的歷史人文風景線上，可見「革命加戀愛」小說成爲一種時尚。

我想就張資平談點看法。正如作者所說，他是複雜的。從「消費文化」的小標題來看，所突出的是他的「革命加戀愛」小說追求商業性及迎合「中產階級」

的趣味。情況確實如此，但不無反諷的是，他的小說一面被國民黨禁止，另一面遭到「左翼」的攻擊。他反蔣反共，也失去了文學市場，大約是因三十年代初讀者趣味迅速變化的緣故。考量到張資平的複雜性，我們似乎對他的「革命」層面應有所關注，尤其在當時的歷史語境裏「革命」話語正逐鹿中原，而且包括在文學市場中，如彭小妍灼見地指出張資平小說中的「烏托邦」特質²。從他以自然主義加上無政府主義對女性的再現來看，儘管那些女子看上去半新不舊，但有一點是他不讓她們成為賢妻良母，我想在這一點上，張資平是分享了新文學的那種整體性「革命」的激進方案的，這也是他與「鴛鴦蝴蝶派」的根本區別之處。

另一方面，在論及蔣光慈、茅盾等「左翼」作家時，指出他們寫作「革命加戀愛」小說有「賺錢」的意圖，甚至把女性身體當作「戀物對象」，然而對這些未作深入討論，反而再三強調他們反對國民黨和資產階級的一面。文學商品性影響到「革命加戀愛」小說對女性身體的表現策略，如在茅盾的〈追求〉裏，最後出現章秋柳的「卻爾斯頓」的舞姿，意味深長。這幾乎是她的頹廢的標誌，而「跳舞」的母題貫穿整個小說，同「跳舞場」相聯繫，也切入王仲昭「追求」報紙新聞版面改革的情節。在二十年代末的上海，跳舞場正「風起雲湧」，光顧者從賣笑女子、名媛淑女到時流貴冑，幾乎涵蓋社會各階層。茅盾的這種寫法，就商品性的程度與質量而言，比張資平不知要高出多少，似乎不止是向時尚暗送秋波，或投合小資情調而已。我的閱讀不一定對，只是覺得在目前的現代文學研究中，對於文學商品的研究是個弱項。如果不僅僅將它等同於低級趣味，而是把它作為一種「現代性機制」來看，或能給研究打開一些新的門窗。最近王斑從「商品形態與文學的歷史變遷」的角度提出：「商品文學對於相對於主導政治文化的正面意義，仍然可以討論，應該用較為辯證的方法揭示出其中的政治作用。」³這一看法是值得重視的。

² 彭小妍：《海上說情慾——從張資平到劉吶鷗》（臺北：中央研究院中國文哲研究所籌備處，2001年），頁27-56。

³ 王斑：《歷史與記憶：全球現代性的質疑》（香港：牛津大學出版社，2004年），頁255。

The Magnitude of Ming: Command, Allotment, and Fate in Chinese Culture. Edited by Christopher Lupke. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005. Pp. xii + 377.

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近年來隨著文化研究的興盛，學界吹起了一陣以團隊合作的風潮，探究中國文化中單一漢字的概念意涵，如近幾年來在國內引起熱烈討論的「情」、「報」、「公」、「私」，乃至於美國和臺灣相互響應的「案」等等集體研究，都有相當可觀的成果。有別於傳統漢學界最早探究「仁」、「道」、「孝」時大多是從思想的角度出發，這一波研究的特色是更貼近生活與情感的文化脈絡。此次所評介的探討「命」概念的專書，就具備了這樣的性格。

根據編者 Christopher Lupke 在本書〈序言〉所說，本書的緣起是在一九九六年時，他巧遇當時正在撰寫博士論文的 Deirdre Sabina Knight，Knight 的研究主題是現代中國文學中有關宿命論與女性命運的問題。這個題目引起 Lupke 的興趣，兩人認為「命」這個概念在中國文化中影響的層面既深且廣，然而卻還未見有系統研究，於是就規劃在美國的亞洲研究學會 (AAS) 中組織一個討論主題。本書就是以該場次的八篇論文為基礎，再擴大充實而成。

儘管是對中國文化中「命運」觀的興趣促成了本書的形成，但是組織者 Lupke 顯然有更大的雄心，意欲探討以「命」這個字為核心的多重意義。筆者受命撰寫本書書評以來，直到赴日本開會後的餘暇，才得空拼命閱讀本書，因此不免聯想到日語有關「命」的稱謂與辭義。在日語同樣是「命」這個漢字，有時必須以「いのち」、「みこと」、「ことば」、「なづける」等差異甚遠的發音，來訓讀出「生命」、「天命」、「誥命」、「命名」等意義；來自漢語音讀的「運命（うんめい）」、「壽命（じゅみょう）」等辭彙還不算在內，突然置身於這樣的語境下，不免有相當奇妙的感覺。沾染中國文化如此悠久的日語，尚且無法習慣以單一的發音來概括如此多樣的內涵，當初漢語是基於什麼樣的因素，把這些意義都以「命」這個字來稱呼？從本書的副標題“Command, Allotment, and Fate in Chinese Culture”可以看出，尋找這個問題的答案，是本書的目標之一。而本書的一開頭，就試圖從語源學的角度，來探討「命」這個字在漢語中的原始形態。

根據 David Schaberg 對於甲骨文、西周金文以及上古典籍的解讀，早期對於「命」的用法都是集中在「呼叫」、「命名」等方面，更具體地說，所用的場合包括了敘封爵位、占卜天意以及祭祀鬼神等重大儀式。在這個時期的「命」定義，

或可稱為「賦予力量的正式通知」(頁27)。至於這種文義如何推廣到其他的種種用法，Schaberg做了一個大膽的推測，他指出敘爵或占卜之後，往往當事者接著都要面臨不可知的未來，所以修短難料的生命以及變幻莫測的境遇，後來都從此衍申而來。要證明這樣的推論，將十分困難。不過，或許在有關「命」的各種意義的研究有較多成果之後，可以進一步揭露語言演進的軌跡。

這本書是在西方的學術環境下產生，因此不少學者的詢問方式也就不免從西方的角度出發，詢問中國的命運觀與西方思想的宿命論(fatalism)以及決定主義(determinism)之間，究竟有著什麼樣的比較關係。有幾位撰稿人明確提到對這個問題的關心，如Schaberg的說法單純有趣，他指出金文中每次出現「命」這個字的場合，總是帶有一種懇求的語氣，這就暗示這個字本身帶有可以人為操弄的性格。而中國希臘比較研究的專家Lisa Rachals則是明確點出雙方的命運觀固然有許多一致的部分，然而西方的宿命論隱含著沒有改變餘地、與自由意志矛盾這兩點基本精神，這就與中國的命運觀有著根本的差別。為了徹底表述中國命運觀的內涵，Rachals甚至列出「命」這個字所有的辭義，並且舉出與「命」連用的各種動詞，例如「知命」、「造命」、「歸命」、「立命」等等，進而指出中國人對於「命」可以有多種多樣的態度去面對，也認為「命」可能加以控制或改變。

有些學者或許不那麼針對東西比較來立論，卻同樣重視中國的命運觀是否容許改變的問題。如Patricia Sieben的論文舉出了明代的雲棲株宏、袁黃、劉宗周等人相信具有改變命運實效的「功過格」。蒲慕洲所選的是一個有趣的例子，他所分析的是出土的秦代「日書」，從書中教導讀者在面對各種日常生活行事時如何趨吉避凶看來，其背後的假設正是人的未來可以在一定程度內，以某種作法改善。只不過，在相信可以經由書中教導的原則來改變的前提，卻已承認了命運法則的強大力量。

然而中國人不僅相信命可能改變，甚至認為可以控制，Stephen Bokenkamp與Robert Campany的作品就是表現這個面向。前者討論中古時期道教所宣稱可以經過修煉的過程，而對死亡免疫，後者同樣討論道教的長生技術；但是更有趣的是，Campany將討論的範圍更為擴大，除了早期《太平經》所說修命必須累積功德之外，他也提到了藉由修改仙人手中記載每個人生命長短的簿冊，從而延長壽命的傳說，正彷彿只要塗改存摺，就可以增加存款一般。

也有一些學者不甚理會中國的命運觀與西方宿命論之間的區別，如Sabine Knight的精彩分析，指出直到二十世紀的小說，宿命觀仍然以神祕化的形式，成

為性別壓迫的幫兇。另外 Steven Sangren 對於《封神榜》的討論，也強調一切都早已決定，即使眾神也無法違逆商朝的天命即將終結。作者似乎忘記了故事中是紂王先褻瀆女神，才遭受懲罰。不過本文的重點在於指出：無論是諸神抑或是更高的主宰「天命」，其實都是文化的產物。書中假借天命所作的種種情節安排，終究都是作者創造力的表現。

另外幾位學者則主要是探討中國人面對命運態度所表現的文化內涵。如 Michael Puett 就反對奉天行道與遭逢命運蹇滯兩者間存有矛盾的說法。他認為天人之間本質上是一種緊張關係，不可能用單純的機械對應來解釋。蔡宗齊 (Cai Zongqi) 則是分析陶淵明如何自處於「命」的各個層面之間。他指出陶淵明一直為宿命與道德之間求取平衡而掙扎，而在面對命運變幻的挑戰後，他選擇了隱遁生活，致力於求取天命的道德價值以及永世之名。而編者 Lupke 在探討四部現代小說之餘，看出中國人將所遭遇種種悲劇均歸諸於命運，然而儘管命運限制了生命，但卻也是命運賦予生命的力量。他更進一步指出，在中國的論述裏，越是避談命運，越可看出命運的無所不在。

書中某些論文其實與「命」的關係不大，如 Woei Lien Chong 有關思想家解釋中國近代的困境起因於思想的傲慢的論文，與本書主題連接之處，可能只是他所討論的思想家，都會同意「命」的觀念阻礙了中國的近代化這一點而已。不過，這篇論文從不同角度剖析共產中國與帝制時期的本質相同之處，見解犀利，值得一讀。

由於筆者才學以及書評字數限制，不能將各篇論文的精髓一一加以詳述與評論。但總的來說，從上述諸多角度剖析「命」多重且深層的意義，已經展現出「命」的概念在中國文化中的關鍵性，實有進一步深入探索的潛力。儘管還有許多重要課題在本書未被討論，但這本書的內容已經相當豐富，無疑已經為相關主題奠定了良好基礎。

更正啓事

本刊第二十六期刊載書評論文〈本體與工夫合一：陽明學的展開與轉折〉，根據作者林月惠博士來函，部分更正如下：

註8 彭國翔考訂的查刻本《龍溪王先生會語》，藏於北京大學善本室，此乃萬曆四年的刊本，而京都大學人文科學研究所圖書館所藏之查刻本《龍溪王先生會語》是以北大為底本而加以影印。故二者應屬同一版本。彭國翔指出北大所藏查刻本《龍溪王先生會語》為萬曆四年刊本之祖本，卷末有君山手書「識語」，題為「昭和丙子十一年正月十日」，昭和十一年為一九三六年（見彭書頁638）。而京都大學人文研之影印本，卷末亦有君山學人稻葉岩吉的「珣記」，說明此書流傳與影印的經過，並有詳細的出版項。依稻葉岩吉的「珣記」，彭國翔考訂此版本之流傳頗有疏漏之處。要言之，查刻本《龍溪王先生會語》乃由日本學者稻葉岩吉(1876-1940)於朝鮮京城（今韓國首都首爾）所發現，經由安岡正篤(1898-1983)的建議，在昭和七年(1932)於京城府（首爾）的朝鮮株式會社印刷發行。稻葉岩吉先生，號「君山」，是日本研究「滿鮮史」的專家，是內藤湖南(1866-1934)的學生。他於一八九八年師事內藤湖南，於一九〇〇年至中國留學。一九〇四年日俄戰爭爆發時，曾任鴨綠江第一師團司令部的陸軍通譯，開始清朝史研究的契機。一九〇六年夏天，與內藤湖南訪問京城，拜訪白鳥庫吉，於其所設置的「滿鮮歷史地理調查室」從事研究。一九二二—一九二五年主掌「朝鮮史編纂委員會」。一九三二年（昭和7年），日本關東軍佔領東北，成立「滿洲國」，一九三七年（昭和12年）於長春（新京）創設建國大學。稻葉岩吉乃辭朝鮮總督府修史官，任教於建國大學，講授「滿洲發達史」、「滿洲國史通論」。換言之，稻葉岩吉在日本「滿鮮史」的研究上，有其學術地位。而稻葉氏所看到的《龍溪王先生會語》是韓國文人李建昌所藏。李建昌字鳳朝，號寧齋，有《明美堂集》三十卷傳世（見《韓國歷代文集叢刊》第1513-1514冊）。故人文研圖書館之《龍溪王先生會語》之底本（即北大藏本），係韓國朝鮮時代陽明學者鄭霞谷（齊斗，1649-1736）家所藏，後為李建昌所藏。稻葉岩吉獲此刊本於韓國京城，經由牛島省三的建議，於韓國印刷發行。筆者推測此書的底本後為稻葉岩吉所有，之後在他任教建國大學時（昭和12年[1937]），歸回中國，故北大藏本乃有君山「昭和丙子十一年正月十日」（1936年）的「識語」。此乃此書流傳之經過。又筆者核對彭國翔所引之佚文，錯字不少，亦有斷句之誤，筆者將另撰一文考訂之。